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Theory, History and Evidence of Economic Convergence 




Economic convergence exists when two or more economies tend to reach a similar level of 
development and wealth. The study of convergence is an important topic because besides being useful 
for the debate between different theories, it can respond several inquiries such as if the distribution of 
income between economies has become more equal over time and if poor economies are catching up 
with the rich. Latin American countries are characterized by having few language barriers, similar 
culture, religion and common history. So convergence could be expected. However, literature about 
convergence in Latin America is scarce and preliminary analysis shows that divergence exists in the 
region. The thesis tries to fill in the gap by covering theoretical, historical and statistical evidence of 
convergence in the region during 106 years, from 1900 to 2005. The thesis uses a neoclassical growth 
model based on Solow and Ramsey models. After revising the economic history of 32 countries, 
several groups were identified and convergence was expected to occur. Different concepts of 
convergence are tested inside each group through graphs, single cross section regressions and panel 
data estimations. In general, the results show a success with the grouping. However, the groups that 
converged under all concepts are those composed by countries that have succeeded in industrializing 
and/or were able to build strong institutions that could tight welfare and economic growth in a 
globalization context. The speed of convergence for those countries is around 2%. It is also found that 
integration processes have not helped to accelerate convergence.   iii 
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The economic convergence term is used when two or more economies tend to reach a
similar level of development and wealth. It is a topic that has been studied broadly by
economists. On the one hand the study of economic convergence is used in the debate
between the di⁄erent theories of economic growth. The debate is usually between the neo-
classical, endogenous and distribution dynamics models. The neoclassical models argue for
economic convergence between similar economies, the endogenous models for no conver-
gence at all, and the distribution dynamics models for economic convergence depending on
how economies interact over time.
On the other hand, aside from the theoretical discussion, the study of convergence has
a practical application in that it can respond to several inquiries. For example it answers
to the questions of whether or not the income distribution between economies changes over
time, if the di⁄erences in income across countries tend to disappear or increase, if poverty
persists and whether those countries that were relatively poor at some point will later catch
up with the rich countries. Certainly, it is important to detect income disparity between
countries because it can retard the process of economic development.
Figure 1￿1 reveals that the distribution of the world income, measured as the GDP per
capita, has become increasingly unequal. The income gap between rich and poor countries
has increased year after year. The ￿gure also shows that, contrary to the world pattern, the
OECD countries have been converging. This can be expected because the OECD countries
are the most developed and may share more common characteristics between them than
with the African countries for example.
However, not all countries with similar characteristics converge. As the ￿gure shows,2
the Latin American countries, which have few language barriers, similar culture, religion
and common history, have diverged. The LA countries were more similar to each other than















Figure 1￿1: GDP per capita dispersion in the World, OECD and
Latin America. Standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita.
Nevertheless, when taking a closer look to the Latin American case, before 1950, the
pattern of GDP dispersion changes. Figure 1￿2 shows that LA￿ s high dispersion is not only
observed in recent years but it was also observed at the beginning of the 20th century.
Moreover, when the income dispersion is graphed only for the 8 countries (Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela) that have complete data since
1900 until 2005, see Figure 1￿3, the pattern of dispersion is reversed. The income dispersion
among these economies, has diminished since 1900 and in 2005 the level for dispersion was
even lower than the OECD countries.
So, income dispersion among the 8 Latin American countries (8LA) has diminished but
among all the LA countries has increased. Furthermore, the pattern of dispersion for all
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Figure 1￿2: GDP per capita dispersion in Latin America. Standard
deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita.
convergence in Latin America and certainly, Latin American countries are not as similar
as expected.
Literature about economic convergence in LA countries is scarce compared to other
groups of countries. From the vast convergence studies outside Latin America, the majority
are usually focused on investigating convergence among regions inside countries rather
than cross-country studies. Similarly, the research found on Latin America is centered
on national convergence studies. Only few studies are dedicated to studying convergence
among countries. Almost none of the research connects convergence to the economic history
of Latin America nor analyzes groups inside LA that are believed to be homogenous.
Moreover research is usually conducted using only a small number of countries or few
years.
This thesis will study economic convergence among LA countries from the beginning
of the 20th century until 2005. The main purpose of this thesis is to explain why some
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Figure 1￿3: GDP per capita dispersion among 8 Latin American
countries. Standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita. The 8
Latin American countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru,
Uruguay and Venzuela.
￿ Has the convergence pattern changed in 106 years?
￿ Have economic shocks in LA in￿ uenced on the path of convergence?
￿ Is it possible to determine di⁄erent periods of convergence?
￿ Under which periods have convergence accelerated? What are the empirical and
theoretical reasons?
￿ Are there other groups besides the 8LA were convergence can be expected? Have
these groups in fact converged?
￿ Which groups have converged the most? What are the empirical and theoretical
reasons ?
￿ What are the reasons behind the apparent convergence among the countries in the
8LA? Should more convergence among them be expected?5
￿ Why does it seem that all the countries have diverged but not those from the 8LA?
￿ In the future which countries may converge to which?
￿ Has economic integration processes in the region helped to accelerate the process of
convergence?
In order to answer all the questions and comply the objective of the thesis, the study
will cover theoretical, historical and statistical aspects of convergence in LA. The thesis
will analyze di⁄erent theories that study economic convergence with emphasis on the neo-
classical growth theory, from which the basis model is extracted. The basis model is based
on the growth model of Ramsey (1928) and optimal growth model of Solow (1956). The
model has a solid theoretical framework, it is the most used in the literature, it is simple to
test and it reaches concrete results about convergence. The model is able to test whether
income distribution among di⁄erent economies has become more equal and if there has
been an upward mobility in the same distribution and how fast this has been.
Convergence will be tested in certain groups of countries were convergence is expected
to occur. To identify those groups of countries the thesis will analyze carefully the most
important facts of the Latin American economic history during 106 years. The convergence
tests will be carried by non linear least square regressions and panel data estimations.
Therefore, the structure of the thesis is organized as follows. The ￿rst chapter will ex-
plain the theoretical background of economic convergence stressing in the model used in the
study. The second chapter will present a review of previous literature about convergence.
The third chapter will present and discuss the methodology to test convergence in LA.
The fourth chapter will present the results of convergence in each of the groups identi￿ed
after the carefully revision of the economic history of LA. Additionally the analysis will
be extended to test convergence in the integration process that LA has witnessed. Finally,
the conclusions will be presented.6
Chapter 2
Theory of Convergence
This chapter introduces in detail, the theoretical growth model that will be used in the
further estimations of convergence and compares it to other models that also study con-
vergence. The purpose of this chapter is to make clear all concepts of convergence with an
emphasis on those concepts that are used in this study.
The chapter contains four sections. The ￿rst section speci￿es the basic foundations
of a neoclassical growth model (NGM), used in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), which is
based on the growth model of Ramsey (1928) and optimal growth model of Solow (1956).
Furthermore, it discusses the di⁄erences between absolute and conditional convergence, and
beta (￿) and sigma (￿) convergence. The second section explains the main characteristics
of other three models that also study convergence. The ￿rst one is the endogenous growth
model. The second, the distribution dynamics model that derives convergence within
clubs of countries that emerge over time. The third is the technology di⁄usion model
which is based on microfoundations and derives the catching-up convergence concept. The
third section explains brie￿ y the link between the theory of economic integration and
convergence. Finally, a summary of the most important points and concepts is presented.
2.1 The Neoclassical Growth Model
The neoclassical growth models try to predict stylized facts of economic growth and one
of them is convergence. It seems, empirically, that conditional on relevant characteristics
for economic growth, there is a negative relation between initial income levels and growth
rates of income of a certain period. This means that rich countries tend to grow less than
poor countries, once some conditions are settled. This kind of convergence is known as7
conditional convergence and it is well forecasted by the NGM whenever economies have
similar technologies and preferences.
The NGMs are based on an economy with a speci￿c production function and a util-
ity function that represents its preferences. Under some assumptions, the economy will
eventually arrive at an equilibrium called the steady-state, where it cannot grow anymore.
If the economy is approaching its steady-state, there is convergence but if it is moving
away from the steady-state, there is divergence. The NGM used here, is able to calculate
the speed of convergence at which the economy gets closer to its own steady-state. The
procedure is explained below
2.1.1 Production Function
The production function is a Cobb-Douglas with labour augmenting technological progress1:
Y = F(K;LA) = K￿(LA)1￿￿; (2.1)
where Y is the output, K;L and A are the capital, labour and technology respectively,
and ￿ is the share of capital (0 < ￿ < 1). The technology A grows at a constant rate x.
The former equation can also be written in e⁄ective labor terms (since is homogenous
of degree one):
^ y = f(^ k) = A^ k￿; (2.2)
where ^ y = Y=AL and ^ k = K=LA. In a closed economy, under equilibrium, savings
equals investments, implying that ^ k moves dynamically according the following equation:
￿
^ k = A^ k￿ ￿ ^ c ￿ (￿ + x + n)^ k; (2.3)
where ^ c is the consumption in e⁄ective labor terms, ￿ is the depreciation rate of capital
and n is the constant growth of the population (or labor).
1As usually a neoclassical production funtion, assumes constant returns to scale in capital and labour,
positive but diminishing marginal product of inputs, essenciability of inputs and satisfaction of the Inada
conditions.8
2.1.2 Utility Function
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where c is consumption per capita, ￿ is the elasticity of marginal utility and ￿ is the
rate of time preference2 The solution of the maximization problem yields to the dynamic
equation for consumption (Ramsey, 1928):
_ c=c = (1=￿) ￿
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De￿nition 1 The steady-state equilibrium is the situation in which various quantities grow
at constant rates (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004)
The steady-state is reached when output, capital and consumption in terms of e⁄ective






^ c = 0), so variables in terms of per capita grow at a
constant rate, x; and level variables grow at rate x + n:
From Equation(2.3), the Steady-State is given by:
sf(^ k￿) = (￿ + x + n)^ k￿;
where ^ y￿ = f(^ k￿) is the steady-state value of ^ y and s is the saving rate (s < 1):
When an economy starts with a level of capital per unit of e⁄ective labor lower than
the one in the steady-state (^ k(0) < ^ k￿), the capital level will monotonically increase until
it reaches its steady-state value. This means that its growth rate declines monotonically3.
Since output varies together with capital, the output growth rate will also be monotonically
declining when its level is below its steady-state level. In other words poor countries
2and by the transversality condition, that assures utility maximization in the long run, ￿ is higher than
n + (1 ￿ ￿)x:
3The proof is in Appendix 2D of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).9
will grow faster than rich countries, assuming that both have the same technologies and
preferences, until they converge to the same steady-state.
2.1.4 The Logic of the Speed of Convergence
In order to quantify the speed of convergence it is necessary to log-linearize the Equations(2.3)
and (2.5) around the steady-state. This consists in taking the ￿rst-order Taylor expansion
of both Equations4. The result, which is saddle-path stable, is:
log[^ y(t)] = e￿￿t ￿ log[^ y(0)] + (1 ￿ e￿￿t) ￿ log(^ y￿); (2.6)
where ￿ is the negative eigenvalue from the process of Taylor expansion and 0 < ￿ < 1
. The condition ￿ < 1 rules out leapfrogging or overshooting, where poor economies are
systematically predicted to get ahead of rich economies at future dates and when ￿ > 0
means there is convergence. Thus ￿ can be interpreted as the speed of convergence.
After doing some transformations, Equation(2.6) can be written as:
(1=T) ￿ log[y(T)=y(0)] = x +
(1 ￿ e￿￿T)
T
￿ log[^ y￿=^ y(0)]; (2.7)
where the left-hand side of the equation is the average growth rate in the interval from
0 to T. Notice that the left hand side is not anymore in terms of e⁄ective units (in terms
of ^ y). This is because the "e⁄ective" part, the technology, now appears in the right-hand
part as the growth rate of technology x because of the transformations.
Equation(2.7) says that the average growth rate of output in the interval T is related
negatively to the initial output y(0) in relation to the steady-state output ^ y￿, and to
the technology growth rate x, while keeping ￿ and T constant. This implies conditional
convergence in the sense that a poor country A will grow faster than a rich country B,
understanding that country A is poorer because it is away from the steady-state than
country B is and that both have the same steady-states.
4This is done in Appendix 2D of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).10
If the period taken into account is quite long, and ￿ is taken as given, the average
growth rate of output will tend to approach the technological growth rate and the negative
e⁄ect of the initial position, y(0), will be diminished. So as T ! 1;(1￿e￿￿T
T ) ! 0. And
when the period is quite short T ! 0;(1￿e￿￿T
T ) ! ￿ (by l￿ hopital rule), the negative e⁄ect
of y(0) will be ￿.
When ￿ increases, taking T as given, the term (1 ￿ e￿￿t) increases as well, which
means that at high levels of ￿; the response of the average growth to the di⁄erence between
logy￿and logy(0) is greater.
2.1.5 Theoretical Behavior of the Speed of Convergence: an Unrealistic pre-
diction
The speed of convergence determination, is also a result from the log-linearization and by
assuming a constant saving rate as in Solow (1956), yields5:
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (x + n + ￿): (2.8)
Here, ￿ depends on parameters not connected to the utility function; it is increasing
with the exogenous technology growth, population growth and the capital depreciation,
and decreasing with the share of capital, ￿. In the extreme case when ￿ = 1, convergence
is zero. This would be the case of the endogenous growth model with AK technology.
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where ￿ = ￿ ￿ n ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ x > 0
This complex de￿nition of speed of convergence varies with a lot of parameters linked and not linked to
the utility function and with the behavior of the saving rate during the transition towards its steady state,
which is:
s
￿ = ￿ ￿ (x + n + ￿)=(￿ + ￿ + ￿x):
The transitional dynamic of the gross saving rate is monotonic; when the economy begins with a low
value of ^ k, then the saving rate increases if s
￿ > 1=￿, decreases if s
￿ < 1=￿ and it is constant if s
￿ = 1=￿.
The way parameters in￿ uence ￿ depends on the interaction with the saving rate. A higher value of ￿, the
intertemporal substitution coe¢ cient, increases the chance that the saving rate rises with ^ k and therefore
reduces the speed of convergence (because we are closer to the steady state). In (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
2004), it is shown that when ￿, ￿ and/or x increases the speed of convergence increases as well, but when
n increases the impact on ￿ is not clear.11
To have some idea of the theoretical speed of convergence one can substitute believable
values for the parameters in Equation(2.8) . In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) the exercise
was done with values of growth rates for technology and population of 2% per year for each
variable, capital depreciation rate of 5% per year, constant saving rates and a capital share,
￿, of 0.35. The result was ￿ = 0:059 per year which means a half-life for the logarithm of
output per e⁄ective worker of 11.8 years (= ln(2)=0:059). A speed of convergence of 0:059
is a rapid rate compared to ￿ ￿ 0:02, which is the empirical estimate normally found by
applied research (see chapter 3)
To get the empirical estimates of ￿ ￿ 0:02, according to the theory, would imply a
capital share of 80%, which is extremely high. A more ample de￿nition of it as human
and physical is one way to explain the high share of capital. A capital share of 80% (and
x = n = 0:02;￿ = 0:05) implies that economies tend to stay far from the steady-state for
long periods: every 34.7 years an economy will be in half way closer to reach its steady-
state.
Thus to explain through theory the 2% of convergence found empirically, requires high
levels of share of capital, ￿. Under variable saving rates, this is possible if the intertemporal
substitution parameter, ￿, acquires high values and if the depreciation rate of capital, ￿, is
almost zero. Unfortunately these values are not realistic at all (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
2004).
Relaxing Assumptions
In order to ￿nd an explanation of the high theoretical speed of convergence or a solution
to "cool it down", di⁄erent variations were introduced and some assumptions relaxed.
For instance, when permitting for perfect factor mobility, unrealistic results were found.
Among them were in￿nite theoretical speeds of convergence, and that the most patient
country asymptotically owned everything and consumed almost all of the worlds output
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
An additional variable was added, the costs of installing extra capital, which indeed12
brought ￿nite speed of convergence. These adjustment costs cannot by themselves explain
the low speed of convergence observed empirically. Then, to relax the assumption of in￿nite
horizons and to open the economy, both together, do not solve the problem either.
Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1992) extended the neoclassical growth model by
distinguishing between two types of capital: the ￿rst one is mobile and can be used for
borrowing and lending from one country to another whereas the second one cannot be used
as collateral (the second type can be interpreted as human capital is not mobile). Under
these extensions, the theoretical value of the speed of convergence is close to the empirical
of 0:02. The estimations are still based on high proportions of ample capital, ￿ 80%, but
from this, some can be used as collateral and some not. The proportion that can be used
as collateral is from 0 ￿ 75% which yields a convergence speed of 0:014 to 0:035.
2.1.6 Absolute vs. Conditional ￿-Convergence
Above, the concept of conditional convergence was explained, which in short says that
when the growth rate of a country is positively related to the distance from its initial level
of income to its own steady-state. In other words, countries grow more if they are initially
further away from their own steady-state.
Meanwhile absolute ￿-convergence exists when poor economies grow faster than rich
ones, regardless of whether they have a common steady or not. So poor countries tend to
"catch up" when time passes.
Equations
The two concepts can be described through equations. For the conditional convergence,
the average growth rate from Equation(2.7) can be written for each country i and include
a random disturbance ui0;T:







￿ log[^ yi0] + ui0;T: (2.9)
If ￿ > 0 there is conditional convergence.13
absolute ￿-convergence still de￿nes a negative relation between the average growth
rate and the initial income per capita, but excludes explicitly the steady-state income and
the technology growth rate:
(1=T) ￿ log[yiT=yi0] = a ￿
(1 ￿ e￿￿T)
T
￿ log[^ yi0] + ui0;T; (2.10)
where a is a constant, that may or may not include the steady-state and technology
growth rate, and if ￿ > 0 there is absolute convergence
Both concepts can refer to the same de￿nition and can be measured by the same
equation, in some cases. But in others they contradict each other and measuring can raise
some problems.
Di⁄erent Concepts When Di⁄erent Steady-States
When economies reach conditional but not absolute convergence, means that a rich econ-
omy can grow faster than a poor if the rich is further below its own steady-state than
the poor is in relation to its own steady-state. So both, rich and poor, have di⁄erent
steady-states. In this case the correct equation to measure convergence is Equation(2.9)
because it will measure the convergence of each country to its own steady-state. If instead
Equation(2.10) is used, it will be misspeci￿ed and the error term will be:




i ] + xi
and if ^ yi0 is related to ^ y￿
i , ￿ as estimated will be biased. But if ^ yi0 is not correlated
to ^ y￿
i , ￿ will still be correctly estimated though Equation(2.10) misspeci￿es the underlying
process.
Equivalent Concepts When Similar Steady-States
Conditional and absolute convergence have the same de￿nition for country A and B if both
converge to the same steady-state. This will be the case if both have equal technologies14
and preferences. In this case, when estimating Equation(2.10) the constant a will be:





and ￿ is consistent.
2.1.7 ￿ vs ￿ Convergence
The two concepts studied above refer to ￿-convergence. The ￿s from Equation(2.10) and
Equation(2.9) try to measure the mobility of income within the same distribution. On the
other hand ￿-convergence studies how the distribution of income varies over time.
￿-convergence analyzes the dispersion of income of diverse economies and convergence
occurs if the dispersion is diminishing over time. Usually it can be measured as the standard
deviation of the logarithm of income per capita across di⁄erent economies.
It can be seen from Appendix A, that when there is ￿ divergence it does not necessarily
lead to ￿-convergence. But in order to have ￿-convergence it is necessary to have ￿-
convergence. Therefore, ￿-convergence is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for ￿-
convergence.
2.2 Other Models
2.2.1 Endogenous Growth Models
The endogenous models di⁄er from the NGM in that they do not assume diminishing re-
turns to capital. For example the one sector AK model is based on the following production
function:
Y = AK;
which can be compared to a Cobb-Douglass when the share of capital is 1, ￿ = 1. This
can be interpreted as a taking a broad de￿nition of capital that includes human capital.
This type of production function violates the Inada conditions and does not exhibit the
diminishing returns to capital. Replacing ￿ = 1 in Equation(2.8), leads to ￿ = 0. So it
does not matter if a country is poor or rich, the poor will never catch up to the rich.15
In general, the one sector models of endogenous growth fail to predict any kind of con-
vergence, even when perfect or partial capital mobility is introduced. However variations in
the AK model can explain convergence. That is the case when the saving rate, the depre-
ciation rate and/or the population growth rate are allowed to be endogenous (determined
by the level of capital in the economy). But as pointed out by Sala-i-Martin (1996a), these
variations are often seen as implausible, not deeply explored or fail to explain convergence.
In the case of two sector models, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1992) have showed that
these models are able to predict conditional convergence in the same way that the NGM
does.
2.2.2 Models of Distribution Dynamics
In the literature, this type of models is also referred to as polarization, persistent poverty (or
poverty traps), strati￿cation, and/or clustering models (Quah,1996; Quah, 1997; Azariadis
and Stachurski, 2005; Durlauf and Johnson, 1995).
In the models of distribution dynamics, each economy has multiple locally-stable steady-
states. Transitory shocks may have permanent e⁄ects whereas the NGM assume that
economies have a unique, globally stable steady-state equilibrium and that the transitory
shocks a⁄ect the income ranking of an economy in the short run but do not have lasting
e⁄ects (Galor, 1996)
The idea of the models of distribution dynamics can be explained by ￿gure 2￿1, which
shows hypothetical income distribution across countries. The GDP per capita is showed
on the vertical axis and time on the horizontal. At time t0 the income distribution has
one peak, while later, say at t1 there are two peaks: one for countries with high levels of
income and another for low. Countries with middle income levels have disappeared. Some
went to the low income group and others to the high income group. At least it is clear that
the ones that were at t0 among the richest ended up in the top group in t1 and viceversa.
This process of changing distribution in income into two is called "emerging twin peaks".
This means that at t1, countries converge to two di⁄erent groups, even though they were16
t0 t1
Figure 2￿1: Distribution Dynamics. Hypothetical income distributions
in two periods. One-peak income distribution in period t0 and two-peak income
distribution in period t1. Taken from Quah (2007).
at t0 in the same group. The number of groups at t1 can also be more than two, in which
case the process is called "strati￿cation" and each group is called a "club".
From this analysis, the concept of "Club Convergence" arises. Club convergence among
a group of countries exists, when they have a similar steady-state and when they depart
from similar initial conditions (Galor, 1996). Quah (1996) emphasizes that what matters
most is how a single economy performs relative to others, rather than to its own history.
According to Galor (1996) the NGM can generate both the conditional and the club
convergence concept, particularly the neoclassical model of overlapping generations. He
a¢ rms that in practice both concepts can be estimated by the inclusion of empirical sig-
ni￿cant variables like human capital, income distribution and fertility in the NGM, along
with capital imperfections, externalities, and non convexities.17
2.2.3 Technology Di⁄usion Models
These models predict convergence based on microfoundations. It is argued that poor
countries will "catch-up" slowly to the rich ones (leaders), because the followers can imitate
the products invented by the leaders. This idea was introduced by Nelson (1966), where
it was stated that the technological progress for a country is a function of the distance
between its level of technology and the world leader:
_ Ai
Ai
= ￿(Aleader ￿ Ai)
By assuming that imitation and implementation costs are lower than innovation costs,
when very little has yet been copied, the lagging countries can imitate and converge gradu-
ally to the leaders level of technology (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).When more products
are being copied, the imitation and implementation costs will rise. Therefore convergence
is created by a diminishing returns to imitation.
In practice, these models can be estimated in a similar way as the NGM. Once conver-
gence is found, it is hard to distinguish whether the reason of its existence is the neoclassical
hypothesis of diminishing returns to capital or the hypothesis of positive (but slow) rates of
technological di⁄usion unless one can model how technology evolves in the leading countries
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
The process of technology di⁄usion is still in debate. Some researchers argue that
the technology di⁄usion is via foreign investments (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), trade
(Romer,1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), ￿ ows of people (Barnebeck and Dalgaard, 2006)
or the type of institutions and geography (Acemoglu et al., 2004).
2.3 Theory of Integration
Economic integration among countries is linked to economic convergence. The theory of
economic integration studies the creation of a common market as a process that goes
together with economic growth. The deepening of this process tends to be deepened, via18
monetary and political integration, coupled with growth is related directly to the idea of
convergence among countries and regions (Sotelsek, 2001).
However, the process of integration can have obstacles that delay the process of con-
vergence. One obstacle is that the integration process may have a di⁄erent impact in
certain economic sectors and regions. Another is the possible absence of considerable ef-
forts of harmonization of institutions and policies. These obstacles postpone one of the
main objectives of the integration process, which is to increase the standards of living of its
population and diminish the existent disparities in the standards of living of their citizens,
(Sotelsek, 2001).
Conceptually, economic convergence can be de￿ned broader than discussed so far
as a process, spontaneous or with some intention, that leaves economies in a similar degree
of development. Economic integration can be de￿ned as a process that is intended
to follow speci￿c objectives and rules previously agreed to by its members that lead to
economic convergence.
Alternatively, full economic convergence is the last resulting phase of economic integra-
tion. The integration process itself has three phases, (Heirman, 2001):
1. Convergence of basic instruments like common external tari⁄s and commercial regu-
lation among its members and to other countries
2. Convergence in macroeconomic, ￿scal and social policies
3. Convergence in real terms
These phases are connected to the stages of economic integration, which total six, and
for every two stages, one phase of convergence is reached. The stages are:
1. Preferential trading area
2. Free trade area
3. Customs Union19
4. Common market
5. Economic and Monetary Union and
6. Complete economic integration.
Currently, the only integration process that is in the last phase of convergence and last
stage of economic integration is the European Union. Nevertheless, Walz (1999) tested
the hypothesis that integration has promoted economic convergence among the European
countries and found that it is rejected. It seems that the economic convergence created by
the European Union is across regions rather than countries.
In LA the most advanced economic integration processes are still in the third stage
of economic integration: custom unions. Consequently, they are in the second stage of
convergence; in macroeconomics, ￿scal and social policies. Still, this study will test for
convergence in real terms among countries in each of the custom unions in Chapter 5.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has explained the main characteristics of the neoclassical growth model used
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), which is the base model for further estimations, and
has presented other important theories about convergence.
The theory of convergence, in general, has de￿ned four concepts of convergence: ab-
solute ￿ , conditional ￿, ￿ and catch up convergence. Absolute ￿-convergence exists when
per capita incomes of a number of economies converge to one another in the long run,
independently of their initial conditions. Conditional ￿-convergence exists when per capita
incomes of economies that have identical their structural characteristics (e.g. preferences,
technologies, rates of population growth etc.) converge to one another in the long run
independently of their initial conditions. Club convergence is ￿ conditional convergence
conditioned also on having similar initial conditions. ￿-convergence across a group of
economies exists if the dispersion of their real per capita GDP tends to decrease over time.20
Finally the concept of catching up, means that poor economies will reach the rich economies
when time passes, which is the same concept as absolute ￿ convergence.
Once convergence is found, under the NGM, the theoretical reasons can be two: di-
minishing returns to capital and/or lower costs of technology imitation than innovation.
Additionally, convergence can also be due to a result of an intended process, in the case of
integration agreements. However economic convergence is expected only in the last stage
of the integration process.21
Chapter 3
Empirical Literature
This chapter presents a review of previous empirical research on convergence. The purpose
of the chapter is to summarize the main results found in world wide studies and specially
in LA.
The chapter has three sections. The ￿rst explains about the usual methodology used
to test convergence and discusses the "typical" values found for the speed of convergence
in di⁄erent samples. The second section is focused on the LA case. The last section
summarizes the main ￿ndings.
3.1 World Wide Studies
In general, empirical research about convergence has focused on the conditional convergence
concept rather than the absolute, given that the latter is rejected by the fact that poor
countries have not converged to the rich ones yet (De Long, 1988). The usual procedure
is to run a regression derived from the NGM theory, where the dependent variable is the
growth rate of the GDP per capita during a speci￿c period and one of the explanatory
variables is the initial GDP per capita of the period. The coe¢ cient of the initial GDP per
capita determines whether there was convergence or not1.
There are two ways to test conditional convergence. One is to add to the regression
explanatory variables that proxy for the steady-state,and the other is to group similar
economies and test for absolute convergence assuming they have the same steady-state (no
1There are other methods as GMM (Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 1996) Chamberlein Matrix (Cashin
and Loayza, 1995),(Cashin and Sahay, 1996) and (Loayza, 1994). Error Correction Models (Astorga et al.,
2005), and Unit root test (Chumacero, 2002). For the dynamic income analysis: MonteCarlo simulations
and sthochastic Kernel distributions analysis (Quah,1996), (Quah, 1997) and (Blyde, 2006) among others.22
explanatory variables). The majority of the studies examine samples of economies inside
a country (i.e. regions, states, cities, provinces, etc.) because they are more likely to share
the same steady-state.
The existing research concentrates on convergence among industrialized economies. De
la Fuente (2002) presents an extensive review of literature and summarizes the key features
of convergence pattern in the following tables. Table 3.1 shows regional convergence in
di⁄erent countries and di⁄erent samples. The ￿rst column shows the results with a single
cross section and the second with panel data regressions. The results show higher speeds
of convergence when estimating through panel data than through single cross section.
However, the general pattern is that the speed of convergence is around 2%.
Table 3.2 shows the results for convergence tests among countries and regions with
cross-section data. The last column, shows whether or not controls were added in the
growth equation. It can be seen that only for the ￿rst case, of 98 countries, results with
and without controls vary a lot. The other results show that when the grouping is done
among similar countries, absolute and conditional convergence tend to be close. Again, the
typical speed of convergence is around 2%.
3.2 Studies of Latin America
The research done in LA is scarce. It is hard to ￿nd as many studies as for the industrial
countries. However, after an exhaustive revision of literature, only 11 studies analyzing
convergence across LA countries were found
Table 3.3 summarizes the eleven studies. The ￿rst two studied convergence in a in-
ternational context. They tested for convergence in several regions and one was LA (18
countries). Helliwell and Chung (1992) found that, during 25 years (1960-1985) and after
controlling for several variables, the OECD and LA countries strongly converged, while
African countries weakly converged and Asian countries did not converge. Similarly, (Dob-
son et al., 2003) found conditional convergence in LA and African countries, while less




48 US states 0.017 0.89 0.022
1880-1990 [0.002] [0.002]
47 Japanese prefectures 0.019 0.59 0.031
1955-1990 [0.004] [0.004]
90 EU regions 0.015 0.018
1950-1990 [0.002] [0.003]
11 German Regions 0.014 0.55 0.016
1950-1990 [0.005] [0.006]
11 UK regions 0.03 0.61 0.029
1950-1990 [0.007] [0.009]
21 French Regions 0.016 0.55 0.015
1950-1990 [0.004] [0.003]
20 Italien regions 0.01 0.46 0.016
1950-1990 [0.003] [0.003]
17 Spanish regions 0.023 0.63 0.019
1955-1987 [0.007] [0.005]









[1] 98 countries -0.0037 0.04 no
1960-1985 [0.0018]
[2] 98 countries 0.0184 0.52 yes
1960-1985 [0.0045]
[3] OECD 0.0095 0.45 no
1960-1985 [0.0028]
[4] OECD 0.0203 0.69 yes
1960-1985 [0.0068]
[5] 48 US states 0.0218 0.38 no
1963-1986 [0.0053]
[6] 48 US states 0.0236 0.61 yes
1963-1986 [0.0013]
Sample and Period Other variables
Table 3.2: Previous studies of convergence among countries and
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Table 3.3: Previous research about convergence in Latin America26
From the remaining nine studies, three focused on economic integration processes in
LA. They tried to evaluate integration e⁄orts under three economic blocs: MERCOSUR
(Mercado Comœn del Sur - Southern Common Market), LAIA (LA Integration Association
), and MCCA (Mercado Comœn Centroamericano-Central American Common Market).
Convergence was found in MERCOSUR and LAIA but not in MCCA. Moreover, (Blyde,
2005) found two clubs in MERCOSUR, one large club for low and low middle income
countries and a small for rich income countries
The last six studies were devoted to studying convergence among LA countries. In
general they analyze few years and/or small number of countries, focussing on the most
developed in LA. All studies found conditional convergence in their results. Nevertheless
each study analyzed di⁄erent countries, periods and introduced di⁄erent control variables.
The longest period study is for 100 years, by Astorga et al.(2005), but only for 6
countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. They found a similar
speed of absolute and conditional convergence, with panel data and error correction models,
of around 1.4%.They choose these countries because the are the larger economies in terms
of GDP and population. Similarly El￿as (2001) analyzed 7 countries, the same countries
as before plus Peru, for 45 years. Through graphs of the ￿ coe¢ cient, the author found
that there was convergence of GDP per capita, capital, labour and productivity. However,
divergence was found when comparing the 7 countries with USA.
Studies with more countries but fewer years found convergence but with di⁄erent in-
terpretations. Dobson and Ramlogan (2002) and Utrera and Koroch (1998), analyzed
convergence for 19 countries and 30 years, and 20 countries and 42 years respectively Both
found absolute and conditional convergence at a speed of around 1% in all cases. On the
other hand, Dabus and Zinni (2005) found both, absolute and conditional convergence, but
at very high speeds mostly after adding the control variables. The authors argue that once
controls are introduced and extremely high speeds of convergence are found, compared to
absolute convergence, is a signal of divergence. The reason is that when controlling by
many characteristics, an hypothetical speed of convergence is being calculated and the real27
would be absolute convergence, when countries are compared with out any controls. So
they conclude that convergence of any type is absent in LA. Finally, Blyde (2006) uses dis-
tributional dynamic approach and found that countries are converging into two groups; one
large for low and low middle income countries and another small for rich income countries.
The number of studies of national convergence in LA countries is greater but usually
concentrated in only few countries, such as in Argentina (Garrido, Marina, Sotelstek, 2002),
(Utrera and Koroch, 1998), Brazil (Magalhaes, Hewings and Azzoni, 2005) (Azzoni et
al., 2001), Mexico (Calder￿n, 2006), Chile (Serra et al., 2006) , Colombia (Cardenas and
Ponton, 1995), and Peru (Serra et al., 2006). Typically, the speed of convergence found is
around 2% as in El￿as and Fuentes (2001), where they analyzed 34 regions in Argentina and
Chile and in Marina (2001) for the Argentinean case. Azzoni et al.(2001) found a speed of
less than 1% for Brazil, and, higher rates were found by Anriquez and Fuentes (2001) for
the Chilean case and by Cardenas and Ponton (1995) for the Colombian (around 4%).
3.3 Summary
After an exhaustive revision of literature it can be concluded that a lot of studies have
focused on national convergence cases rather than cross country studies. Moreover, the re-
search is centered in industrialized countries rather than the developing countries. However
among the world wide studies it seems a typical ￿nding is a speed of convergence about
2%.
The scarce studies about convergence in LA, do not disentangle the di⁄erent periods in
the economic history and its association with convergence. Their results are quite diverse
and not robust. They study either short periods or a small number of countries and the
controls that are introduced to approximate the steady-state vary greatly.
As Durlauf and Quah (1999) concludes, the choice of the steady-state￿ s proxies depends
on the interest of the researcher and that can lead to wrong results. Therefore the inter-




The preceding chapters showed the theoretical background of convergence and the empirical
application. This chapter presents and discusses the methodology to test convergence in
LA in a historical context. The purpose of this chapter is to establish the methodology
followed to obtain the results in chapter 5, together with its theoretical assumptions and
possible obstacles.
The chapter contains ￿ve sections. The ￿rst describes the model speci￿cation. It exam-
ines the equation and the variables to be estimated in order to test for ￿ and ￿-convergence.
The second details the source of the data, the sample of study, and the calculations done
to solve some measurement errors. The third, discusses the way the grouping is done. The
fourth, compares the pros and cons of the di⁄erent econometric tools together with possi-
ble problems such as endogeneity, the presence cross-country heterogeneity and unbalanced
panel data. Finally, the chapter ends with a summary of the methodology.
4.1 Model Speci￿cation
The analysis of convergence consists of estimating growth Equations to quantify the speed
of convergence, ￿-convergence, and analyzing graphs of the GDP dispersion among coun-
tries during time, ￿-convergence. The present analysis takes into account several periods
and groups of countries within which convergence is tested. The argument of testing con-
vergence in certain groups (and periods) is that inside each group, countries tend to have
similar steady-states and initial conditions so that convergence is expected ex ante. This
section introduces the main Equations to be estimated and section 4.4 explains in detail
the estimation tools.29
4.1.1 ￿- Convergence
The model speci￿cation follows from the univariate Equation(2.7) studied before, and it
can be written as 1:
￿it = a ￿ b ￿ log[y0it] + uit; (4.1)
for i = 1::::N and t = 1::::T
where,
￿ ￿it is the average growth rate for country i, at period t, calculated by: ￿it = (1=￿) ￿
log[yit=y0it]), where ￿ is the number of years included in period t, y0it is the initial
and y￿it is the last GDP per capita of period t;
￿ a is the intercept of the equation;
￿ b is the regressor coe¢ cient, calculated as b =
(1￿e￿￿￿)
￿ , where ￿ is the speed of
convergence (if ￿ > 0) and ￿the average length of ￿ for period t;
￿ uit is the disturbance term and uit ￿ N(0;￿u):
Equation(4.1) is estimated using di⁄erent methods. First, it is estimated as a single
cross section regression (t = 1) by Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) method, and the
parameter estimated is ￿ instead of b: Therefore, the equation estimated with NLS is:
￿i = a ￿
(1 ￿ e￿￿￿)
￿
￿ log[yi] + ui: (4.2)
Later, Equation(4.1) is estimated through panel data methods. The ￿xed e⁄ect
method (FE) allows the constant term a to vary with each country and be related to the
regressor (called the unobserved e⁄ect). Therefore, the equation estimated under FE is:
￿it = ai ￿ b ￿ log[y0it] + uit: (4.3)
1It is assumed that y = ^ y30
The random e⁄ect method (RE) adds a country speci￿c unobserved e⁄ect, ai; to the
error term that behaves like a usual error term as well (Greene, 1999), except that for each
country there is one unique sample extraction that appears in the regression identically in
each period. Therefore the equation estimated under RE is:
￿it = a ￿ b ￿ log[y0it] + "it; (4.4)
where,
￿ "it is the error term and is represented as: "it = uit + ai;
￿ "i ￿ N(0;￿");
￿ ai ￿ N(0;￿a):
Pooled OLS (POLS) is similar to Equation (4.4) but assumes that ai = 0. Therefore
POLS estimates:
￿it = a ￿ b ￿ log[y0it] + uit: (4.5)






￿-convergence exists among a group of countries if the dispersion of their real GDP per
capita levels tends to decrease over time:
￿t < ￿0t
where,
￿ ￿t is the standard deviation of log(y￿it) across countries during the last year of period
t;31
￿ ￿0t is the standard deviation of log(y0it) across countries during the the ￿rst year of
period t:
So by simply looking to the GDP per capita dispersion graphs it can be determined
whether there was ￿-convergence or divergence.
4.2 Data Description
The analysis covers 32 countries, listed in the appendix, for the period 1900-2005. The
potential number of observations is 3.392, but because not all countries have complete
data, the number of real observations is reduced to 2.183.
The main variable chosen is the GDP per capita measured in constant 1990 Interna-
tional (Geary-Khamis) dollars. This measure allows the comparison of standards of living
of each country; it takes into account the purchasing power parity of currencies in each
country and the international prices of commodities (Maddison, 2003).
The source of information is mainly from the Madison Data Base (M) (Maddison, 2003)
updated with the World Bank Data Base (WB)(World Development Indicadors).
The World Bank GDP is measured in constant 2000 international dollars and is available
from 1960 to 2005. Meanwhile the Madison GDP data is measured in constant 1990
international dollars and is available from 1900 to 2001 (earlier data is found for only few
LA countries). So the M data base was updated with the WB data. The WB data base
was transformed to terms of constant 1990 International Dollars, from 1990 to 2005, by a
converter factor2
There were some cases where the treatment was slightly di⁄erent. In the case of Cuba
with the WB, the GDP available was in constant 2000 Local Currency. Here, the converter
factor was calculated with that kind of data and kept constant for the year 2001. In the
case of 10 small Caribbean countries, M had no data at all, the converter factor was taken
2The converter factor was calculated as the ratio of the GDP from the M data base to the GDP of the
WB data base:
C(1990) = M (1990)/ W (1990).
The factor was calculated for each year and was kept constant.from 1995.32
constant, for the year 1995, from another country that heavily in￿ uenced these economies
and assumed to have a similar converter factor3.
In addition, the data base went through one more transformation. In the type of
regression to be estimated, Equation(4.1), it is important to avoid abnormal values and a
solution is to use circa values, which are three year annual averages of the GDP per capita.
From this data the dependent variables were calculated as the geometric annualized average
growth of each period4.
4.3 The Grouping
In order to answer the questions stated in the Introduction, this study, uses economic
history facts to group countries into similar periods with similar characteristics, such that
convergence is expected and consequently tested. This section explains the estimation
methodology of Equation(4.1), from which ￿-convergence is tested for all groups.
The grouping is done by collecting countries that tended to follow similar economic
patterns and were a⁄ected by the same external shocks. The point is that inside these
groups, similar steady-states are expected. In order not to divide the groups in an arbitrary
way, the analysis is based on Thorp (1998). From her analysis, this study substrates 3
important periods: 1900-1930, 1931-1974, and 1975-2005. Moreover in each period, two to
three groups of countries are identi￿ed. Additionally, the four custom unions now existing
in LA and the 8LA are also studied. Therefore, in total 18 groups are analyzed: collecting
all LA countries￿ s in each period composes 3 groups, 8LA in each period another 3, 2 groups
for the ￿rst period, 2 groups for the second, 3 for the third period, 4 from the 4 custom
unions since their inception and 1 for 8LA over all periods.
Groups have thus been formed by conditioning on having similar features. In each
3The converter factor from USA was taken for Antigua and Barbuda, and The Bahamas; from Great
Britain for Barbados and Belize; from Haiti for Dominica St.Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Vincent and
the Grenadines; from Colombia to Guyana, and ￿nally from Dominican Republic to Grenada.
The converter was taken constant for the year1995 and then multiplied by the World Bank data, which
in most of the cases was available from 1975 to 2005.
4For the ￿-convergence analysis the normal values were analyzed33
group, absolute and conditional convergence are then tested. Testing convergence per
group is convenient because it gives less demand on the limited data of the determinants of
growth, mostly at the beginning of the 20th century. According to Sala-i-Martin (1996b),
one should restrict the convergence study to a set of economies for which the assumption
of similar steady-states is realistic because in this way the steady-state is hold constant.
Additionally, when dividing the analysis by groups that vary across time, one could
refer to club convergence as well. Club convergence analysis points out that the initial
conditions determine the club to which each country converges. In practice, one way to
test the existence of club convergence is by setting certain threshold of the initial conditions,
and if the initial conditions of certain economies are above the threshold they converge to
one club and if they are below they converge to another (Chumacero, 2002). In the present
analysis, something similar is done: the threshold is determined by economic shocks given
in history. Since it is possible to look back to history it is easy to identify convergence
clubs according to how each country responded to di⁄erent economic shocks together with
their internal characteristics. Countries that responded in a similar way could be in the
same group. However, the most used technique to test for club convergence is Monte Carlo
simulations or Sthochastic Kernel distributions, which is not done in the thesis.
4.4 Econometric Tools
As mentioned above, Equation(4.1) is estimated for several groups by single cross section
and panel data regressions. On the one hand, single cross section regressions show a
complete picture of each group and period. They can capture the long term convergence
and its procedure is simple and straight forward. Panel data estimations instead divide
the analysis into subperiods, which may capture short-term adjustments around the trend
rather than long-term convergence, the existence of business cycles tends to bias upward
the estimates of speeds of convergence. Moreover, panel data estimations rely on strong
assumptions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
On the other hand, panel data regressions present advantages as well. Panel data meth-34
ods can handle unobserved characteristics for each country, such as culture, traditions,
institutions, etc. On the contrary, single cross section regression ignores these characteris-
tics and can produce biased coe¢ cients. Furthermore, the time variation that panel data
introduces may produce robust results of convergence in the sense that it tests convergence
in short spans of time and takes into account information for countries that may lack data
for some years.
Consequently, both methods are used. The single cross section regression helps for the
general view and the panel data goes into more details. Most importantly, when absolute
convergence is found under both methods, it means that the results are robust. So it is a
way of testing robustness of the estimations.
4.4.1 Single Cross Section Regressions
The single cross section regression (Equation 4.2) is estimated by NLS method instead of
OLS for several reasons. First, when using NLS, di⁄erent speeds of convergence can be
directly compared across samples with di⁄erent lengths without using transformations (as
the parameter estimated is ￿ and not b). Second, NLS is correct and the standard errors
of the parameters are the right ones 5.
It is possible that countries disturbances are correlated (i.e. E[uiuj] 6= 0). Thus the
estimations allow for this type of correlation by calculating the robust heteroskedastic
standard errors.
The results could be biased and inconsistent if there were endogeneity problems, or
in other words if the regressor (the initial condition of each period) was not exogenous.
There are three potential sources of endogeneity: Omitted variables, measurement error
and/or simultaneity (Wooldridge, 2002). Regarding omitted variables, since the grouping
5Eq.(4.2) can also be regressed by OLS on the following linear relation:
￿i = a ￿ (1 ￿ b) ￿ log[yi] + ui;
where 1 ￿ b =
(1￿e￿￿T )
T
If b < 0 NLS in no longer correct. Therefore b should be postive, which is the case for the further
estimations.35
is done according to economic history and inside each group similar economies are gathered,
a lot of controls are implicitly included. To illustrate this point lets take the ￿rst period, in
which two groups of countries are identi￿ed: the mineral and the agricultural. Countries
that are included in the mineral group, have been controlled implicitly by the mineral
sector characteristics which, at that period and for those countries, are the most important
determinants of growth. Moreover, the lag of GDP can be enough to capture all the
dynamics needed to explain growth. It includes past growth rates, which means that past
growth accounting variables and past growth sources variables are included6.
Measurement error in the GDP per capita at the beginning of each period (the regressor)
can be present due to poor calculations and they may be temporary. This problem is
diminished by smoothening the data such that the temporal errors tend to disappear.
Finally, simultaneity is not possible because the average growth rate of a period of
30 years, for instance, cannot determine the initial conditions of that period, unless the
growth rate of the period was expected 30 years before, which is not likely.
In conclusion, the NLS method is used without controls for the steady-state since the
group of countries are assumed to have similar steady-states. So, the NLS estimations
measure the absolute ￿-convergence within each group.
4.4.2 Panel Data Estimations
Panel data estimations allow for time variation and need special treatment of the data. In
all cases the number of periods is lower than the number of countries, so the asymptotic
properties of panel data estimators are ful￿lled (T < N) (Wooldridge, 2002). Furthermore,
the spans of time periods (of each t) are long enough to minimize the problem of capturing
short-term adjustments around the trend rather than the long term convergence (in average
12 years). Additionally the regressions will allow for aggregate time e⁄ects.
The di⁄erence between RE and FE method depends on the assumptions on ai in Equa-
6Growth accounting variables are the variables used to calculate the GDP, growth source variables are
the determinants of growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).36
tions 4.4 and 4.3 respectively. If the unobserved characteristic of each country, ai, is
uncorrelated with the initial condition of each period (E(ai j y0i) = 0), the RE method is
better, and if it is correlated (E(ai j y0i) 6= 0), the FE method is the appropriate (this can
be tested by the Hausman test).
Similar to single cross section regressions, panel data regressions rely on exogeneity of
the regressor (the initial condition). The di⁄erence is that single cross section regressions
rely on contemporaneous exogeneity while panel data rely on strict or sequential exogeneity
7. Both, FE and RE methods, are based on strict exogeneity and POLS on sequential
exogeneity. If any of the assumptions fail, the results can be biased and inconsistent.
In this case the regressor (the initial condition) is sequentially exogenous. The average
growth rate of a period of 30 years (the dependent variable), for example, cannot determine
the initial conditions of the same period, as explained above, or the initial conditions of
past periods but it can determine the initial condition of the next period. Therefore POLS
is appropriate.
The di⁄erence between POLS and RE is that the former discards information about the
structure of the error term ( ai) if it turns out to exist and to be signi￿cant (Wooldridge,
2002). Fortunately this can be tested by the test introduced by Baltagi and Li (1990)
which is an extended Breusch -Pagan test for unbalanced panels. Under the null ￿a is 0,
so POLS is correct (the test is carried out during the estimations and the great majority
show that POLS is better)
There is no di⁄erence between POLS and FE when the POLS estimations allow for
serial correlation between units (using clusters) and country speci￿c dummies are included
in the regression. Equation(4.5) would look like:
￿it = a + cai ￿ b ￿ log[y0it] + uit; (4.7)
7Strict exogeneity exists when the error term is uncorrelated to the future, present and past values of the
regressor (conditioned on the unobserved e⁄ects); sequential exogeneity when the error term is uncorrelated
with present and past values of the regressor (so it is allowed to be correlated with the future values); and
contemporaneous when the error term is uncorrelated with present values of the regressor.37
where the estimated b and its standard error are the same as the ones estimated by FE.
Therefore, the estimation of Equation(4.5) is interpreted as absolute ￿-convergence
and the estimation of (4.7) as conditional ￿-convergence since dummies for each country
are included and they control speci￿c country unobserved characteristics that do not vary
over time, like geography location, institutions, culture, traditions, weather, and most
importantly the steady-state of each country.
Unbalanced Panel Data
The available panel data for this analysis is not balanced; some countries do not present
information for all years (usually the ￿rst years). This can be a problem if the reason of
missing information is related to the error term, but when the reason is connected to the
regressor, panel data estimators are still valid. Here, the reason of the absent data is due to
the development of each country. At the beginning of the century, only strong economies
had data (some countries were still colonies). Therefore, missing information is due to low
levels of GDP at the beginning of each period (the regressor) and panel data estimators
are valid.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has presented and discussed the methodology to test convergence in LA.
The appropriate methodology consists of, ￿rstly, grouping the countries according to their
common characteristics of development, and then, testing convergence inside each group
of countries. Absolute ￿-convergence will be estimated by cross section regression through
NLS and by panel data through POLS. The di⁄erence between NLS and POLS is that
POLS takes into account time varying information and doesn￿ t exclude countries that lack
of data while NLS . Therefore the speed of convergence with NLS is usually higher because
it takes into account less countries and usually the countries that take into account are the
ones that are richer, because that is why they have data. Conditional ￿-convergence will
be estimated by panel data by controlling for speci￿c unobserved characteristics of each38
country. ￿-convergence will be analyzed by graphs of the GDP per capita dispersion of
each group.39
Chapter 5
History and Evidence of Convergence in Latin
America
This chapter analyzes the history and evidence of convergence in LA. The purpose of this
chapter is to apply the methodology developed from the theoretical framework and link it
to the most important historical facts and data of the LA countries to test for convergence.
The chapter starts with a general picture of the LA economic performance and its po-
sition compared to the most advanced economies especially to its neighbor United States.
Then, the chapter illustrates the regional development performance and analyzes the evo-
lution of convergence in 106 years among all LA countries and among the 8LA.
Later each of the three periods de￿ned by common characteristics from the economic
history is explained in detail. For each period, ￿rst, a short summary of the main char-
acteristics and ￿ndings is presented. Second, the description of each period and groups
of countries encountered in each period is explained . The idea is to clarify the reasons
of why convergence could be expected in each group. Finally, the convergence results are
presented.
The convergence results are grouped into the catching-up countries, ￿-convergence and
absolute and conditional convergence analysis. The catching-up countries analysis consists
in looking to the data and identify the countries that catched up, those countries that were
poor at the beginning of the period but that on average for the whole period, grew faster
than the rich countries. The problem with this simple analysis is that it only takes into
account countries that have complete information for the whole period. So this is done
just for description. The ￿ and absolute ￿ and conditional ￿-convergence analysis is done40
g y g y g y g y
s.d s.d s.d s.d s.d s.d s.d s.d
LA 2.1% 1,790 1.8% 2,854 1.2% 4,744 1.6% 3,551
0.076 928 0.063 1855 0.049 3117 0.059 2673
Japan 1.9% 1,532 3.8% 4,097 2.2% 17,355 2.8% 7,248
0.049 292 0.119 2917 0.017 3401 0.083 7117
USA 1.8% 5,342 1.9% 10,460 2.0% 22,892 1.9% 12,647
0.055 755 0.074 3373 0.019 4025 0.057 7605
OECD 1.5% 3,182 2.5% 5,727 2.1% 14,893 2.1% 8,142
0.055 1348 0.077 3434 0.031 6261 0.060 6481
World 1.7% 2,469 2.2% 3,322 1.0% 5,826 1.6% 4,452
0.063 1451 0.065 4338 0.112 6239 0.092 5358
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
1900-1930 1931-1974 1975-2005 1900-2005
Table 5.1: Average growth and GDP per capita for Latin America,
Japan, USA, OECD and the World, per period. Where g is the average
growth rate of GDP per capita per period, measured in %, and y is the average
GDP per capita per period, measured in International $. s.d is the standard
deviation for each variable.
by using the econometric tools explained in the previous chapter.
A similar analysis, but with less details, is done for the integration processes in LA. The
most advanced integration processes are four custom unions that can also be interpreted
as grouping by geography.
5.1 International Context
The average growth for 106 years (1900-2005) has been 1.6% for LA, 2.1% for the OECD
countries and 1.6% for the World (See Table 5.1). The only LA country that grew more than
the OECD countries, during 106 years, is Venezuela: 2.2%1. However, LA has experienced
rapid growth rates, particularly during the ￿rst period, from 1900 to1930,when LAs average
growth rate (2.1%), surpassed the OECD (1.5%), USA (1.8%), Japan (1.9%) and the
Worlds(1.7%) growth rates (Table 5.1).
1Actually the highest average growth rates observed in the table is for St.Kitts and Nevis, followed by
Puerto Rico and St.Vincent and the Grenadines. But they lack data for most of the years41
The rapid LA growth during the ￿rst period was based on their high quantities of
primary exports and capital in￿ ows to the region. Nevertheless, the ￿rst period average
growth rate was also characterized by its high volatility, exceeding the volatility of other
regions and the world in general.
Later, in the second period, from 1931 to 1974, LA grew less, in average 1.8%, which
was lower than the rest of the world (2.2%), Japan (3.8%), USA (1.9%) and the OECD
countries (2.5%). Finally, during the last period, from 1975-2005, LAs growth rate was
lower than ever (1.2%) and lower than the OECD, Japan and USA average growth rates
yet slightly better than the worlds average growth rate (Table 5.1)
In comparison with the closest neighbor, USA, LA has performed badly. The average
GDP per capita from LA for more than 100 years is equivalent to only 28% of the American
GDP per capita during the same period and 12% of the American GDP per capita in 2005.
The dispersion of the average GDP per capita of LA and the US has increased in 106
years. After the WWII started, LA and US diverged greatly and after the WWII ended
the dispersion coe¢ cient went down (Figure 5￿1) but continued increasing later. Clearly
during the last decades, LA lost ground with respect to USA, with the highest dispersion
in 2005.
Nonetheless some LA countries have done better than the average. At the beginning of
the century, Argentina and Uruguay were relatively high income countries and to a lower
extent Chile (See Table 5.2). After 1930, almost all countries declined their position with
exception of Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Jamaica and Brazil. The latter grew a lot during the
Brazilian miracle in the 60s and 70s. In this second period, Venezuela reached the highest
position that a Latin country had reached due to its oil boom. Later, however, Venezuela
fell in position drastically. The Caribbean countries are among the countries with the best
position in the last period, especially The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago.42
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All Periods
1900-1930 1931-1974 1975-2005 1900-2005
arg 0.66 0.53 0.35 0.51
bhs . . 0.57 0.57
blz . . 0.14 0.14
bol . 0.16 0.11 0.13
bra 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.19
brb . . 0.44 0.44
chl 0.46 0.40 0.31 0.39
col 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.22
cri 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.24
cub 0.24 0.19 0.12 0.16
dma . . 0.08 0.08
dom . 0.11 0.12 0.12
ecu 0.18 0.18 0.18
grd . . 0.14 0.14
gtm 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.20
guy . . 0.14 0.14
hnd 0.22 0.14 0.08 0.13
hti . 0.09 0.05 0.07
jam 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.18
kna . . 0.15 0.15
lca . . 0.09 0.09
mex 0.32 0.26 0.28 0.29
nic 0.22 0.19 0.09 0.15
pan . 0.22 0.23 0.23
per 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.21
pri . 0.33 0.46 0.40
pry . 0.15 0.14 0.15
slv 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.14
tto . 0.49 0.51 0.50
ury 0.55 0.45 0.30 0.44
vct . . 0.08 0.08
ven 0.23 0.67 0.41 0.47
LA 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.25
Japan 0.29 0.37 0.76 0.46
OECD 0.60 0.55 0.59
Country
Table 5.2: Relative GDP per capita in relation to USA. Ratio of
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Figure 5￿1: GDP per capita dispersion between Latin America
and USA. Standard deviation between the LA average of the logarithm of the
GDP per capita and the logarithm of the US GDP per capita.
5.2 Regional Context
LA has followed clear patterns along its economic history concerning their development
e⁄orts and their exposure to external shocks. The most important facts resulted into
three periods of development. The division is characterized by a strong external shock,
which made each period di⁄erent to each other. The ￿rst period ranges from 1900 until
1930 - when the Great Depression whipped LA economies- and it is characterized by LA
intensively exporting primary products. Therefore it is called Export-led as Development
Tool. An inward-looking model was the response to the Great Depression, so the second
period is called Import Substitution Industrialization which goes from 1931 to 1974 - when
the oil crises occurred. Finally the third period, Debt led growth, Structural Reforms and
the Paradigm Shift rages from 1975 to 2005, when LA experienced the debt crises of 1979
to 1980, responding with several "structural reforms". From these reforms and from an
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Figure 5￿2: Sigma convergence among all Latin American coun-
tries per period. Standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita among
32 countries.
with a more social outlook in a globalization context arose. This is called The Paradigm
Shift.
5.2.1 ￿-Convergence
The pattern of dispersion for all the LA countries and the 8LA economies has been quite
di⁄erent. In the historical division context it can be seen, from Fig 5￿2 and 5￿3, that
while the ￿rst period exhibited a decreasing dispersion in GDP per capita among all LA
countries, it was the one with the highest dispersion among the 8LA. Contrary, the last
period had the highest dispersion for all LA countries but the lowest for the 8LA countries.
In this way, Figure 5￿2 illustrates ￿-convergence during the ￿rst period, ￿-divergence
during the second and ￿-divergence or null during the last period for all LA countries.
Similarly Figure 5￿3 describes the ￿ pattern for the 8LA: ￿-convergence is seen during 106
years. Periods 1 and 2 particularly show a clear decline in the dispersion and, although
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Figure 5￿3: Sigma convergence among 8 Latin American countries
per period. Standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita. The 8
Latin American countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru,
Uruguay and Venzuela.
5.2.2 Absolute and Conditional ￿-Convergence
All Latin American countries
The results of the estimations of absolute and conditional ￿-convergence are shown in
Table 5.3. The ￿rst period estimations include 13 countries, the second 23 and the last
period 32. The ￿rst column illustrate the results of the NLS estimation of Equation(4.2)
and although the spans of time and number of countries are di⁄erent, the results can be
directly compared. The only period when countries converged in an absolute way was the
￿rst period, at a speed of 1%. The second and third period exhibit divergence.
The second and third column of Table 5.3 show the panel data estimations, which
have been controlled by time e⁄ects2 of the absolute and conditional ￿-convergence from
Equation(4.5) and (4.7) respectively. Clearly the adjustment of the data improves when the
country speci￿c e⁄ects are added (see the R2). The results cannot be compared directly so
2Since the division of subperiods for the panel data is done arbtirarily, the estimations for absolute
convergence are controlled by time-dummies.46
they are converted through Equation(4.6) to yield an estimate of the speed of convergence
￿ and presented in Table 5.4.
The results show absolute ￿-convergence for the ￿rst and the third period at speeds
of 0.5% and 0.7%3, but the second period show absolute divergence. After taking into
account each countries speci￿c characteristics, conditional ￿-convergence is found for the
second and the third periods but not for the ￿rst. The speed of conditional ￿-convergence
for the second and the third was around 6%.
The absolute speeds of ￿-convergence are higher with NLS than with Panel data be-
cause, as said in section 4.4, the NLS estimation excludes time varying information and
countries that lack of data for the ￿rst years of each period. The point of estimating
through both methods is to check for robustness. In this case, the period less robust is the
third but still absolute ￿-convergence is found with panel data, and that is the result the
thesis relies on more.
Preliminary Conjectures From the results some conjectures can be drawn. The fact
that during the ￿rst period, the export growth phase, there was absolute and not condi-
tional ￿-convergence, means that countries were converging due to common external factors
rather than their own characteristics. Once each country￿ s non time varying characteristics
are controlled for, the LA countries diverged.
During the second period of industrialization countries diverged in an absolute way
but converged conditionally. The reason may be that during the second period countries
went on their own way of development by industrializing or not, such that each country￿ s
own experience was more important in determining convergence than the external common
factors as it was for the ￿rst period. Therefore once each country speci￿c characteristics
are controlled for, they converged.
Lastly, during the third period, countries converged in an absolute and conditional
sense, meaning that common external factors were determining the path, like the debt
3The ￿ is 9 years for the ￿rst period, 6 for the second and 7 for the third.47
crises, but also that each country￿ s own experience was important for convergence, such as
the link with the paradigm shift of each country.
These are only preliminary conjectures. More links between the convergence results
and historical events are introduced in the following sections, were each period is carefully
analyzed.
8LA
Regarding the 8LA countries, it can be seen that during 106 years the 8LA converged, in
an absolute sense, at a speed of around 1%.(0.9% with single cross section and 1% with
panel data) and conditionally at a speed of 2.4% (see Table 5.4). According to the NLS
results, the 8LA converged most during the third period, at a rate of 3.3% (in an absolute
way), which is con￿rmed by the Panel data regression (but at a rate of 1.8%). The 8LA
also converged conditionally at speeds of 5.2% during the ￿rst period, 4.4% during the
second and 3.7% during the third.
Preliminary Conjectures As a preliminary conjecture, it can be said that the fact
that in all periods, 8LA converged in an absolute and conditional way suggests that both
country characteristics and external factors helped to shape this pattern.
5.3 First Period (1900-1930): Export-led as Development Tool
The ￿rst period starts in 1900 and ends with the Great Depression crises of 1929-1930.
The main characteristics of the LA countries in this period is that their development was
owed to their exports of primary products. The groups of countries detected in this period
are two: the agricultural group, composed by countries that were specialized in exporting
agricultural products, and the mineral group, composed by countries that exported mineral
products.
￿-convergence was found for the whole period and for each of the two groups, showing
that the distribution of income inside each group and in general, has changed to be less48
disperse. absolute ￿-convergence was found for the whole period and for the mineral
countries, while conditional ￿-convergence was found only for the agricultural countries.
The presence of absolute ￿-convergence and the absence of conditional ￿-convergence,
as it is found for the whole period and for the mineral countries, imply that countries
converged due to external common factors rather than country-speci￿c factors. On the
contrary, the agricultural countries converged only after controlling by each country char-
acteristics, implying that the agricultural countries are quite heteronegous.
Since for the whole period and for each group, absolute and ￿-convergence were not
found simultaneously, it can be said that countries did not really have a common steady-
state, although, during period one and for the mineral group, countries converged. The
reasons for the observed absolute ￿-convergence, are several. First, period one converged
due to the strong convergence of the mineral countries. Second, mineral countries con-
verged, because WWI bene￿ted them. Finally, the poorest of the mineral group, Venezuela,
experienced impressive growth rates because they discovered oil.
5.3.1 Description of the period
During the ￿rst period, the world export demand was high and the capital ￿ ows were
￿ uent. These two facts determined the way LA developed. The economic growth of the
industrial "center" (the developed countries) increased their demand of primary products
(raw material), which was available in LA. LA exported the needed primary products
without any aggregate value and at the same time, LA imported more elaborated goods
produced in the "center" (Thorp, 1998).
The main source of income for LA countries was from their exports. So countries devel-
opment was dependent on their export market and export goods characteristics. Countries
were extremely vulnerable to world income and to ￿ uctuations in primary products prices,
since their exports were concentrated in either agricultural or mineral products. The type
of goods produced was a determining factor in each country￿ s development.
Agricultural production was vulnerable to natural disasters and minerals were vulner-49
able to recessions in the "center", because minerals were used in construction, machinery,
and chemicals production. Moreover, both types of production had di⁄erent spillovers. For
instance, the mining sector was characterized by using less land and less labor, it needed
more capital and technological intensity and had di⁄erent transport needs than the agricul-
tural sector. Therefore, the kind of product determined in some way the "club" to which
countries were converging.
WWI (1914-1918) accelerated the shift in trade and investment structures in LA. The
demand for LA￿ s exports increased and according to Furtado (1981), the war stimulated
the industrial growth in LA, especially in the mineral countries. After WWI the growth
rates were higher for the mineral countries (4% for the period 1920-1924 and 5% for the
period 1925-1929, see Table B.4 in the appendix) than the agricultural countries. (2% for
the period 1920-1929, see Table B.3 in the appendix).
On average the growth rate for the ￿rst period was 2,1%, which was mainly due to the
high growth rate of the mineral countries. The mineral countries grew on average 2,4%
while the agricultural 1,7%. However, the agricultural countries had a higher average GDP
per capita: 1,934 International $ compared to 1,638 $.
5.3.2 Description of the Groups
Agricultural
The agricultural countries were the following eleven: Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, Cuba, Argentina and Uruguay. They were
mainly producing co⁄ee, bananas, cacao, sugar meat and/or wheat.
Those mainly producing co⁄ee were Brazil4, Colombia5, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Brazil and Colombia were the leaders in co⁄ee, and according to Thorp, Colombias quality
of co⁄ee was better than the Brazilians because it was produced by many small producers.
Costa Rica and Guatemala were mainly producing co⁄ee and bananas while Honduras
4Brazil was also producing rubber before 1900 but later co⁄ee dominated more and brought higher
growth rates, railroad expansion, and development of other sectors (Thorp, 1998)
5Colombia also produced gold (Antioquia region) besides co⁄ee.50
was producing bananas and precious metals. In general Central American countries expe-
rienced higher production of bananas after the American multinational company, United
Fruit, came to the region (in the 1920s and 1930s).
Cuba produced mainly sugar but also tobacco. Sugar is a more elaborated product than
raw material, it requires a process to convert sugar cane into sugar. Therefore, investment
in physical capital is needed and this is re￿ ected in Cubas GDP per capita. The only
available data is for one year: 1929, and by comparing to the others, show that Cuba was
among the 5 richest of the agricultural countries in that year (see Table B.3).
Argentina and Uruguay were mainly producing meat and wheat. Both were charac-
terized by having received a lot of immigrants that established in their countries (in other
countries, immigrants did not stay). Argentina was the richest of all countries in GDP
per capita terms and Uruguay was the second rich (see Table B.3). Argentina had a lot
of infrastructure. They constructed railways, ports and was one of the countries with
most trade a› uence. Uruguay experienced the bene￿ts of being close to Argentina. Both
Argentina and Uruguay had similar patterns of growth.
Mineral
The mineral countries numbered four: Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. They exported
mainly petroleum and copper. Petroleum was produced by all except by Chile, and copper
was produced by all except by Venezuela. Before 1917, Venezuela was mainly producing
co⁄ee and cacao, but after that year petroleum became the most important source of
revenue. Mexico was the most diversi￿ed export country in LA. They also exported, lead,
zinc, silver, gold, co⁄ee, rubber and cotton. They discovered its oil in 1910. Chile and
Mexico were the richest after Argentina and Uruguay.
The mineral countries were more volatile than the agricultural. For instance, Peru
experienced the highest yearly growth rate (in 1916 it grew at 24%) and the lowest as well
( in 1921-36%). Venezuela had the lowest GDP per capita of the mineral countries in 1907
(793 International $, and the highest in 1929: 3,426 $51
5.3.3 Convergence Results
Catching-up Countries
According to theory, if poor countries, at the beginning of a period, are growing at faster
rates than the rich during the period, they are catching up. So, by simply looking to data
it can be identi￿ed which countries catched up. The problem with this simple analysis is
that it only takes into account countries that have complete information. for the whole
period. So this analysis objective is only for terms of description.
Period 1 From the countries where data is available for the whole period, those growing
the fastest in average, were Venezuela (4.9%) and Peru (2.4%) and the poorest countries
at the beginning of the period, in 1900, were Brazil (678 $) and Peru (817 $). Therefore
the country catching up during the ￿rst period was Peru.
Mineral From the mineral countries, the poorest country, besides Peru was Venezuela
(821 $), and Venezuela was also the one growing the fastest. Therefore, the country catching
up the most was Venezuela.
Agricultural From the agricultural countries group, the ones with fastest growth rates
were Uruguay (1.9%) and Brazil (1.8%) and the countries with the lowest GDP per capita
in 1900 besides Brazil was Colombia (973 $). So Brazil was the country catching up.
￿-convergence
Period 1 The GDP per capita dispersion fell in Period 1 (Figure 5￿4), mainly after
WWI started (1914). The high degrees of dispersion observed at the beginning seem
to come from the high dispersion degrees experienced by the agricultural group. The
agricultural countries started with a higher GDP per capita dispersion but ended with a
similar dispersion level as the mineral countries. So the agricultural countries experienced
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Figure 5￿4: Sigma convergence in period 1, mineral and agricul-
tural groups. Standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita among
countries in each group.53
Agricultural Looking in detail, the agricultural group showed an increasing divergence
until around 1910 (see Figure 5￿4), then the dispersion decreased reaching the lowest disper-
sion coe¢ cient around 1920 and from there the dispersion was kept constant. The reason
is that Argentina and Uruguay were growing very fast until around 1910 (see Table B.3)
so that the gap from the rich and poor was big. Later, Argentina and Uruguay went into a
deep recession, from 1910-1914 Argentina and Uruguay experienced a negative growth rate
of -2% in average, and Brazil did very well, from 1915-1919 it experienced a growth rate
of 3%. After 1920 Argentina recovered and the gap increased slightly and kept constant
until the end of the period.
Mineral The mineral group experienced the highest levels of dispersion among its coun-
tries around 1907 and the lowest 20 years later (around 1927). During the ￿rst 5 years of
the period all mineral countries were growing at a rate around 2%, and they continued to
do so during the next ￿ve years. The exception was Venezuela, which grew at negative
growth rates, thus widening the gap with the richest. Later, Venezuela discovered its oil
and grew very fast, from 1920 to 1929 its growth rate was around 12%.
Absolute and conditional ￿-convergence
The ￿rst column of table 5.3 show the NLS estimation for absolute ￿-convergence, where the
whole period has converged at 1%, the mineral group converged at a fast speed of 5.6% and
the agricultural countries diverged. The second and third columns illustrate the absolute
and conditional ￿-convergence results with panel data. The speed of convergence under
panel data is in Table 5.46. The whole period converged in an absolute way at a rate of 0,5%
and diverged after conditioning by country characteristics. The mineral countries converged
only in an absolute way at a rate of 3.2% while the agricultural countries converged only
in a conditional way at a rate of 4.5%.
The absolute speeds of convergence are higher with NLS than with Panel data because,
6The value of ￿ is 9 for the mineral group and 14 for the agricultural group54
β R² b R² b R²
[s.e.] [s.e.] [s.e.]
All periods 8 LA 0.0088 0.62 0.0112 0.31 0.0286 0.46
[0.0042] [0.0031] [0.0058]
Period 1 0.0097 0.12 0.0048 0.08 -0.0916 0.62
1900-1930 [0.0115] [0.0089] [0.3425]
8 LA 0.0097 0.12 0.0081 0.19 0.0736 0.57
[0.0115] [0.0098] [0.0774]
Agricultural (9) -0.0016 0.11 -0.0050 0.23 0.0639 0.88
[0.0029] [0.0044] [0.1478]
Mineral (4) 0.0564 0.40 0.0377 0.28 -0.0930 0.59
[0.1287] [0.0335] [0.375]
Period 2 -0.0027 0.01 -0.0011 0.09 0.0778 0.56
1931-1974 [0.0054] [0.0046] [0.0125]
8 LA 0.0121 0.35 0.0086 0.18 0.0553 0.53
[0.0082] [0.0056] [0.0177]
Industrialized (6) 0.0198 0.71 0.0147 0.32 0.0059 0.13
[0.0099] [0.0047] [0.0369]
Non-Industriliz (17) -0.0107 0.13 -0.0067 0.09 0.0853 0.60
[0.0040] [0.0046] [0.0134]
Period 3 -0.0098 0.16 0.0074 0.01 0.0777 0.67
1975-2005 [0.0051] [0.0058] [0.0135]
8 LA 0.0328 0.37 0.0207 0.34 0.0490 0.88
[0.0212] [0.0091] [0.0334]
Good Institutions (7) 0.0296 0.28 0.0219 0.28 0.0477 0.81
[0.0206] [0.0130] [0.0489]
Painful (9) 0.0087 0.14 0.0074 0.14 0.0756 0.80
[0.0022] [0.0054] [0.0234]
Vulnerable (16) -0.0199 0.54 0.0005 0.04 0.0767 0.61
[0.0053] [0.0068] [0.0308]
Regional Blocs
1960-2005 MCCA (5) -0.01051 0.13 -0.01769 0.38 -0.01347 0.86
[0.0087] [0.0109] [0.0430]
1969-2005 CAN (4) 0.00367 0.01 0.00107 0.00 0.05056 0.94
[0.0234] [0.0103] [0.0222]
1975-2005 CARICOM (12) -0.02042 0.55 0.00194 0.05 0.07496 0.64
[0.0054] [0.0075] [0.0332]




Panel data Single cross section
Table 5.3: Convergence estimations. The constant term and the country-
speci￿c e⁄ects are not presented here. The single cross section estimations come
from Eq. (4.2). The panel data estimations come from Eq. (4.5) for absolute con-
vergence and from Eq. (4.7) for conditional convergence. Panel data estimations
are controlled by time-e⁄ects. Positive values of B and b mean convergence, and
negative divergence.55
as said in section 4.4, the NLS estimation excludes time varying information and countries
that lack of data for the ￿rst year of the period. The point of estimating through both
methods is to check for robustness. In this case, the groups of countries that experienced
absolute ￿-convergence are con￿rmed by both methods and are, therefore, robust.
The presence of absolute and not of conditional ￿-convergence, as it is found for the
whole period and for the mineral countries, imply that countries converged due to external
common factors rather than country-speci￿c factors. On the contrary, the agricultural
countries converged only after controlling by each country characteristics, implying that
the agricultural countries are quite heterogenous and to measure convergence it is necessary
to control by each country characteristics.
Since for the whole period and for each group, absolute and ￿-convergence were not
found simultaneously, it can be said that countries did not have the same steady-state,
although during period one and the mineral group, countries converged. The reasons for
the observed absolute ￿-convergence are several. First, period one converged due to the
strong convergence of the mineral countries. Second, mineral countries converged, because
WWI bene￿ted the whole group. Finally, Venezuela discovered oil.
Therefore, the conjecture made in the previous section 5.2.2 about the ￿rst period can
be accepted. The conjecture was that countries were converging due to common external
factors rather than their own characteristics. This is also the case for the mineral but not
for the agricultural groups. So, the division of groups helped to detect the group that was
leading to the general results of period 1.
5.4 Second Period (1931-1974): Import Substitution Industrialization
The second period starts after the US stock market crash of 1929 that lead to the Great
Depression and ends with the Oil Crises of 1974. The LA countries, in this period, were
characterized by applying an inward-looking model of development that consisted in sub-
stituting imports and since imports where characterized by being highly industrialized,





All periods 8 LA 0.88% 1.04% 2.40%
Period 1 0.97% 0.47% -19.32%
1900-1930
8 LA 0.97% 0.77% 5.16%
Agricultural (9) -0.16% -0.52% 4.52%
Mineral (4) 5.64% 3.25% -20.14%
Period 2 -0.27% -0.11% 6.33%
1931-1974
8 LA 1.21% 0.82% 4.40%
Industrialized (6) 1.98% 1.37% 0.57%
Non-Industriliz (17) -1.07% -0.69% 6.82%
Period 3 -0.98% 0.72% 6.25%
1975-2005
8 LA 3.28% 1.81% 3.70%
Good Institutions (7) 2.96% 1.90% 3.62%
Painfull (9) 0.87% 0.72% 5.73%
Vulnerable (16) -1.99% 0.05% 6.18%
Regional Blocs
1960-2005 CACM (5) -1.05% -2.23% -1.59%
1969-2005 CAN (4) 0.37% 0.11% 3.62%
1975-2005 CARICOM (12) -2.04% 0.19% 6.07%
1986-2005 MERCOSUR (5) -0.38% -0.38% 5.85%
Panel Data
Groups of countries
Table 5.4: Speeds of Convergence. Calculated from Table 5.3 and
Equation 4.6.57
period, are two, the industrializers and non-industrializers. As their name indicates, the
industrilizers were able to industrialize while the others failed to do it.
Regarding convergence, ￿ and absolute ￿-convergence was only found for the industri-
alizers group and conditional ￿-convergence was found for the whole period and for each
of the two groups. The presence of conditional ￿-convergence and the absence of absolute
￿-convergence means that countries did not share a steady-state and convergence only oc-
curred after each country unobserved characteristics are controlled for. This is the case for
the whole period and for the non-industrializers.
On the contrary, the industrializers had the same steady-state. With or without con-
trolling for each country speci￿c unobserved characteristics, the industrializers converged.
The reason of their convergence is due to the industrialization process. They were able
to succeed, despite all the distortions that the ISI brought, in innovating some industries
making the technology transmission to be more ￿ uent.
5.4.1 Description of the period
The Great Depression brought a change in prices and henceforth a change in demand from
LA and the rest of the world. The Great Depression provoked a fall in economic activity
in the industrialized countries, which in turn reduced their demand for primary products
and reversed the capital in￿ ows to LA. This situation deteriorated the terms of trade of
all primary products7, leading to an increase of the LA real import prices. The natural
mechanism would suggest a decrease in real export prices which should have stimulated
the demand again, but due to the extreme circumstances of the Great Depression, world
demand could not recover. Instead, the LA countries demand shifted from imported (man-
ufactured) goods to domestic manufactured products, because the former were expensive
This process stimulated the import substitution phase of LA. As detailed by Thorp
7The terms of trade of primary products (ToTPP) is the ratio of the export price of primary products




So when the demand for primary products decreased their prices went down and deteriorated the ToTPP:58
"..it was risky to rely for growth on traditional primary commodity exports and on the
importing of most goods vital for expansion...there was a consensus around the need for
industrialization". Therefore, the Great Depression pushed many LA countries into a
process of import substitution strategy by default (Cardoso and Helwege, 1992).
The process of industrialization via import substitution was reinforced by the WWII
(1939-1945). Although the WWII brought an increase of LA exports, there were constraints
on LA imports. Consequently, the scarcity of imports and the deterioration of the terms
of trade of primary products encouraged new e⁄orts to substitute imports but these e⁄orts
were limited in turn by scarcity of imported inputs and capital goods (Thorp, 1998). Addi-
tionally the consensus on the importance of industrialization via Import Substitution (ISI)
found theoretical and institutional support in the United Nations Economic Commission
for Latin America (ECLA).
Ideology of ISI
The ideology of ISI was based mainly in 6 arguments (Cardoso and Helwege, 1992).
1. Volatility of primary product prices. The primary product markets were unstable
and the concentration of exports on this sector was extremely risky. Agricultural products
were too dependent on natural conditions (they were exposed to natural disasters) and
mineral products were too sensitive to recessions in industrialized countries (minerals, such
as copper, were used in construction and in new equipment), and this was worsened by
speculative stockpiling.
2. Declining terms of trade (commodity good prices < manufactured good prices). The
elasticity of income demand was higher for primary products than manufactured products
(primary products were too sensitive to income changes). So after the Great Depression
and WWII, commodity prices decreased more than manufactured. On the other hand the
manufactured goods prices from the industrialized countries included pro￿ts from inno-
vation, making their prices higher than the primary products. Moreover, technological
progress on manufactured goods led to higher salaries rather than lower prices. Produc-59
tivity gains from technology innovation in primary products, on the other hand, were not
translated into higher salaries, because there was unemployment, but translated to a re-
duction on prices. Therefore increases in productivity in the traditional primary sectors,
bene￿ted overseas consumers rather than producers.
3. Dynamics of natural resources. The LA countries were characterized by being
abundant in natural resources and labor but not in capital. Yet capital still needed to
be accumulated to increase pro￿ts from natural resources. Therefore it was necessary to
attract investments and capital to the region by government intervention.
4. Infant industry. With the help of the government, new enterprises would be created,
which would gain experience in new sectors and become competitive.
5. Spillovers from industry. Industrialization would bring spillovers and would create
other industries with assistance from the government.
6. Elasticity pessimism. The argument was that the ISI would alleviate the balance of
payment de￿cit by reducing imports. There was a belief that real devaluations would have
little e⁄ect on exports. Besides, exports experienced barriers in foreign countries.
The implementation of ISI
The ISI was implemented by national governments and consisted in promoting industries
and restricting imports.
The governments in general promoted all kind of "industries", rather than a selection
of strategic sectors. The way to promote new industries, usually managed by the public
sector, was by lowering interest rates, giving easy credits and controlling prices. Capital
in￿ ows were attracted through loans to the public sector and in some cases Transnational
Companies worked together with the governments and their repatriation of pro￿ts was
limited.
Regarding imports, essential goods were allowed (food, capital goods, and intermediate
good), but there was a limit on imports of ￿nal goods. This was done by having di⁄erent
policies for each type of imported goods. Governments applied multiple exchange rates,60
protective tari⁄s, import licenses and di⁄erent import quotas that could favor the essential
goods imports and reduce ￿nal goods imports.
The results of ISI
As a result of the protection of the national markets, some problems arose. The exporting
sector was discouraged because in order to produce, they were forced to buy high cost
domestic intermediate products, and the restriction of the imports demand overvalued the
exchange rates8, making their prices less competitive. Moreover, ￿scal revenues from the
commodity product sector went down and the public spending rose, creating a ￿scal gap,
which in some cases was monetized and later created persistent in￿ ation. The ISI was
detrimental for sectors that were not intensive in capital like the agricultural sectors and
the artisans. This fact forced people to move from rural areas to urban, creating a larger
urban informal sector. Finally, the low interest rates given by the government to promote
investments discouraged saving whilst helping ine¢ cient ￿rms, and corruption increased
greatly.
On the other hand, there were positive aspects of the ISI. For those countries where
industrialization was strong, innovations were made in terms of organization, technology
and R&D (together with investment in education) like in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.
Another positive side was that some enterprises were ready to export. Overall, more
manufactured goods were produced.
5.4.2 Description of Groups
Industrializers
The industrializers were six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and
Uruguay. Only these few countries succeeded in getting capital goods and creating inter-
mediate input industries, but still had some problems.
8The Real exchange rate (R) of a LAC currency is: R =
p￿
p ￿ e, where e is the exchange rate of a LAC
currency in terms of other currency, p
￿is the international prices and p is the national prices. With import
restrictions, national prices rose, and since LAC countries didn￿ t adjuste their exchange rates, it resulted
in a overvaluation of their currencies, which in turn damaged the export sector.61
Due to their larger domestic markets, Brazil and Mexico managed better than the other
countries in the region. Both created successfully automobile industries. In fact, Brazil
experienced the highest growth rates and went through a process of high persistent growth
rates, called the "Brazilian Miracle", from 1970-1974 Brazil grew at 7%, see Table B.5).
E¢ cient steel production was established in Argentina and Brazil. Chile had political
and social structure problems but still promoted the production (and export) of forestry,
￿shing, mining and engineering sectors. In 1960 Chile tried to produce automobiles but
failed due to its small market size. Colombia industrialized its co⁄ee and was the only
country without an overvaluation, in￿ ation or high levels of debt, but problems of violence
during the 40s and 50s a⁄ected the industrialization process. Finally, Uruguay, was already
industrialized by 1945 but in mid-1950 they went under stagnation.
Non - Industrializers
The non-industrializers are the countries that failed to industrialize. In total they are seven-
teen countries: Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Paraguay,
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, Jamaica, Puerto Rico,
Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba.
The reasons for these countries not to industrialize were diverse. Some stayed as primary
exporters because of their strong dominating primary export sector, which in the majority
of the cases was overprotected by the government, or because the government created
ine¢ cient industrial sectors that were not able to succeed. Others were based on di⁄erent
models as Cuba that was based in a centrally planned model and the Caribbeans that were
based on a model of promotion of exports and industrialization by invitation.
The primary exporters were eight: Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru,
Venezuela, Paraguay and Bolivia. These countries were characterized by having a strong
primary export sector that dominated attempts to industrialize. On the continent, Venezuela,
Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay were not well prepared for industrialization, with
Bolivia and Paraguay the worst cases in terms of results. Further north, El Salvador,62
Guatemala and Nicaragua concentrated on the export of cotton.
Bolivia￿ s strong and powerful tin sector took advantage of a weak state to concentrate
resources9. After the revolution in 1952 the tin sector was nationalized and the government
had immense di¢ culties managing it (the growth rate from 1955-1959 was -3%, see table
B.7) and lastly in the 60s some investment went to mining and petroleum sectors (the
growth rate from 1960 to 1969 recovered to 3%). Paraguay was dominated by a few
families, protected by the military regime of Stroessner, that were producing the traditional
goods (meat and tobacco), making it hard to change economic structures. Paraguayans
experienced negative growth rates for 15 years (in ￿ve-year periods) from 1940 to 1954, on
average -2%.
Venezuela, attempted to industrialize late and the result was the creation of an in-
e¢ cient industrial sector with strong rent seeking characteristics, which brought a lot of
distortions (Thorp, 1998). The Venezuelan economy was highly dependent on its oil with
characteristics of Dutch Disease.
Ecuadors protectionism carried out in the 60s only bene￿ted the traditional elite groups
and failed to industrialize the economy. Peru had good export prospects, so industrializa-
tion through import substitution was low.
El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua concentrated their e⁄orts in the cotton sector,
which required moving peasants from their own lands, making them worse o⁄ (Williams,
1986). During this period Guatemala and Nicaragua grew at 1.4% and El Salvador at
1.9%. All three countries had very low levels of GDP per capita, especially El Salvador
and Honduras. In fact, El Salvador had the lowest GDP per capita from all LA countries.
Based on a model of central planning, Cuba tried to diversify their sugar-concentrated
economy to corn, rice, cotton, tomatoes and soybeans but the lack of skilled labor and
shortages of materials pushed them back to the production of sugar again.
The countries under the export promotion and industrializing by invitation were the
Caribbean. Headed by Puerto Rico, the Caribbean tried to search for di⁄erent markets
9A lot of the debt was directed to pay expensive railroads for the sector63
than sugar. They gave concessions to foreign ￿rms but employment was not created and by
the 60s foreign ￿rms left. However some of the countries experienced high levels of growth.
From 1950, when data starts being available for almost all Caribbean, to 1975, Puerto Rico
grew at 5%, Trinidad and Tobago at 4% and Dominican Republic at 3%. They show high
levels of GDP per capita mainly due to their small size.
5.4.3 Convergence Results
Catching-up Countries
Period 2 From the countries where data is available for the whole period, those growing
the fastest in average, were Brazil (2.8%) and Mexico and Venezuela (2.5% each) and the
poorest countries at the beginning of the period, in 1931, were El Salvador (924 $) and
Brazil (1004$). Therefore the country catching up during the second period was Brazil.
Industrializers From the industrializers, the poorest country, besides Brazil was Colom-
bia (1,448 $) and fastest growing countries were Brazil and Mexico. Therefore, the country
catching up the most was Brazil.
Non-Industrializers From the non-industrializers group, the countries with fastest growth
rates besides Venezuela were Costa Rica (2.3%) and Peru (2.1%) and the countries with
the lowest GDP per capita in 1931 besides El Salvador was Peru10 (1,228$). Therefore the
country that catched up was Peru.
However, these results are not re￿ ecting all the countries information. A lot of countries
that lack data for the ￿rst years but have information for the majority of the years are
ignored in this analysis. This is solved by analyzing the other convergence concepts
10Probably Honduras, Haiti, Guatemala, Jamaica and others were poorer than Peru, but data is not
available.64
￿-convergence
Period 2 Across all countries, the GDP per capita dispersion along the second period
increased. (Figure 5￿5). It seems that the growing dispersion is due to the non industrialized
countries dispersion. The second period does not exhibit ￿-convergence.
Industrializers Clearly the GDP per capita dispersion has diminished for this group.
The industrilizers group experienced at the beginning of the period, high levels of dispersion
among its countries but later the dispersion diminished. They exhibit ￿-convergence. The
reason is that all countries in this group experienced high growth rates which allow them
to converge.
Non-Industrializers The non-industrializers were less diverse at the beginning but they
ended up diverging. Looking to the data of the non-industrializers group in a ￿ve-year
period (Table B.7), shows that the poor countries (except Peru) worsened their situation.
A lot of them experienced continuos negative growth rates, the worst cases being Honduras
(from 1930-1944 in average -3%), Haiti (from 1955-1969, -2%) and Paraguay (from 1940-
1954, -2%). So the reason of divergence in this group is because some poor countries did
very poorly and that widened the gap between rich and poor countries.
Beta Absolute and Conditional ￿-convergence
The NLS estimations of table 5.3 show absolute ￿-convergence only for the industrializers
at a rate of 2%. The speeds of absolute and conditional ￿-convergence with panel data
are calculated in table 5.411. Absolute and conditional ￿-convergence is found for the
industrializers at rates of 1.4% and 0.6% respectively. The result of absolute ￿-convergence
for the industrializers is robust since it is found by NLS and Panel data estimations and
the rates are not too di⁄erent. The whole period and the non-industrializers diverged in
an absolute way but converged in a conditional way at rates of 4% and 7% respectively.
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Figure 5￿5: Sigma convergence in period 2, industrilizers and non-
industrializers groups. Standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per
capita among countries in each group.66
Period 2 and the non-industrializers group do not share a steady-state, since absolute
and ￿-convergence were not found simultaneously, so country controls need to be added to
measure convergence.
On the contrary, the industrializers had the same steady-state. With or without con-
trolling for each country speci￿c unobserved characteristics, the industrializers converged.
The reason of their convergence is due to the industrialization process. They were able
to succeed, despite all the distortions that the ISI brought, in innovating some industries
making the technology transmission to be more ￿ uent.
Therefore, the conjecture of section 5.2.2 about the second period can be accepted.
The conjecture was that during the second period countries went on their own way of
development by industrializing or not, such that each country￿ s own experience was more
important in determining convergence than the external common factors as it was for the
￿rst period. Moreover, thanks to the grouping, it was detected that the industrilizers
converged among them but the non-industrializers diverged.
5.5 Third Period (1975-2005): Debt led growth, Structural Reforms and
the Paradigm Shift
This period starts after the great increase in oil prices in 1974 and ends in 2005, where
availability of data ends. This is the hardest period to evaluate because LA countries have
experienced several changes, each one di⁄erent from the other, making it di¢ cult to divide
the groups. However, the characteristics chosen to guide the division of groups are those
that occurred at the end of the period, because in some way they are a result of what
happen along the period.
At the end of the period countries tried to link growth with welfare in a globalization
context. So countries are divided into three groups: those that were able to provide the
link, the good institutions group, the ones that su⁄ered serious consequences of the debt
crises; the painful group and the Caribbean countries which are di⁄erent from the other
groups and are quite vulnerable to external factors, the vulnerable group.67
Regarding convergence, ￿-convergence was found until 1990 for the whole period and
for the good institutions group. After 1990 and for the other groups the GDP per capita
dispersion was constant in general. Absolute and conditional ￿-convergence was found for
all groups, which shows that all groups shared a steady-state.
5.5.1 Description of the period
The oil shock of 1974 allowed LA to depend more heavily on lending from abroad. The
mechanism is described by Cardoso & Helwege (1992) as follows: "..Oil exporters deposited
their earnings in the commercial banks of developed countries, but higher oil prices caused
a recession in OECD countries and reduced the demand for credit. Left with excessive
liquidity bankers eagerly lent to the Third World at very low interest rates.." . Therefore
LA countries found it reasonable to accumulate debt and did not prevent the coming debt
crises.
The debt crises started in 1979 and 1981 when Unites States and other OECD countries
kept their money supply tight and increased the interest rates radically. Since countries
acquired loans at ￿ oating interest rates, their debt obligations increased a lot12. The
adjustment and consequences of the crises di⁄ered from country to country. Some applied
orthodox and other heterodox policies. The orthodox policies are characterized by being
very radical. They follow the Neoliberal Package (explained below). The heterodox policies
are more ￿ exible, based usually on trying not to harm the workers but maybe not e¢ cient
when solving problems as the imbalance of payments or in￿ ation. However, in general the
adjustment left common problems that reinforced each other such as capital out￿ ows, ￿scal
de￿cits, in￿ ation, overvaluation and balance of payment crises.
Adjustment and Consequences of the Debt Crises
The adjustment of the debt crises was very painful for LA countries. Overvaluation of
the LA currencies from the previous period led to a current account deterioration (exports
12The average real interest rate on LDC debt rose from -6% in 1981 to 14.6% in 1982 (Thorp, 1998)68
were lower than imports). The overvaluation was possible to maintain by the capital
in￿ ows coming from borrowing (during the 70s). Once the debt crises started, the LA
risk increased, since they were not able to pay their debt, and a massive capital out￿ ow
occurred. Governments were not able to continue their policies and had to make drastic
changes. Some countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, responded to the balance of payment
crises by restrictive ￿scal policies to reduce the demand for tradables, which deepened their
recessions. In fact, after the adjustment almost all countries experienced negative growth
rates. The average growth rate for the ￿ve-year- period from 1980 to1985 was nearly -1%.
In general, governments printed more money to cover or keep their ￿scal de￿cits con-
stant. With all the borrowed money, governments were used to spending more than their
incomes13. Since printing money can cause in￿ ation pressures and damage real wages, some
governments indexed the nominal wages to prices to keep real wages constant. Specula-
tors, trying to earn from the indexation, raised prices at higher rates than salaries. Sooner
or later in￿ ation exploded into hyperin￿ ations and governments were no longer able to
manage it.
Hyperin￿ ations have devastating consequences; they damage the lower classes, reinforce
overvaluations, increase country risk and the currency credibility. In fact, a lot of the LA
countries became extremely dollarized. (i.e. Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador)
Countries were desperate to stabilize and gain access to foreign credit again and the
"neoliberal policy package" was an option (or an obligation imposed by the creditors)
to reach stabilization. Some countries took the package as such, and others took some
elements of it.
13During the 70s there was a strong presence of militar regimes and a lot of expenses was directed
to militar equipment (i.e. Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay). Others like Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela
redirected resourse to intensive hydroelectric projects. Colmbia, Mexico and Venezuela ￿nanced a lot of
investments with the loans (Thorp, 1998)69
The Neoliberal Policy Package
The Neoliberal policy package, also known as the "Washington Consensus" was focused on
￿scal orthodoxy, liberalization, and reducing the role of the State. The main institution
prescribing these policies was the IMF, which suggested to cut budget de￿cits by reducing
expenses and increasing taxes), privatize, liberalize imports and exchange controls (devalu-
ate), eliminate price controls (to re￿ ect the real costs), and increase interest rates (Cardoso
and Helwege, 1992). These reforms are summarized for each country and year in the Table
(C.1) in the appendix.
Consequences of the Package
Although countries sooner or later followed the structural reforms, the results were not
as good as expected. The suggested devaluation can solve, in theory, the current account
imbalance by shifting import costs and promoting exports, but in practice, the export sector
of several countries failed to react postitively to the exchange rate depreciation. Moreover,
higher prices of imported goods reinforced in￿ ation and consequently overvaluation.
As predicted by the IMF the state had no role anymore. With higher interest rates
it was hard to promote Investments, and due to the tendency of overvaluation and weak
export sector neither was it possible to promote exports. Furthermore, governments had
to close factories resulting in high rates of unemployment and a larger informal sector.
However, during the 90s some countries experienced a modest improvement in their
growth rates (like Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, etc.) as a result of exports
of natural resources but still their terms of trade deteriorated. Remittances increased,
specially in Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador and Jamaica. Investments and savings increased
but according to Thorp not enough to sustain a serious development e⁄ort. The informal
sector was concentrated in the microenterprises.
Regarding welfare results, income distribution worsened in all countries outside of the
Caribbean except in Uruguay and Costa Rica (in Colombia it was constant). Poverty,
which worsened during the 80s, hardly improved during the 90s (Thorp, 1998).70
Clearly the policy package was lacking of sectorial policies and programs to diminish
social problems and inequalities. This situation pressured a rethink about the link between
growth and equality.
The New Paradigm Shift
Some trends of thought support the idea that good institutions create complementaries be-
tween productivity growth and equality (Neo-structuralists from ECLAC). Others maintain
that policies that are linked to the political constituency will create a combination of eco-
nomic and social development. When the population participates in the process of making
decisions, the feeling of ownership helps to monitor and accomplish their obligations better.
Thorp calls these new currents the New Paradigm Shift, which started at mid 80s, as a
response to the poor welfare results.
Thorp points out that the rise of the paradigm shift is a result of the increasing capital
￿ ows, the debt crises and the costly adjustment process. However, it is hard to attribute
the results to either globalization or policy shifts. Instead, Thorp proposes to look at the
institutional context and each country￿ s experience to derive some conclusions about the
signi￿cance of globalization and the shift in paradigm in terms of growth and social welfare.
For this purpose, Thorp analyzes the factors that have conditioned the industrialization
process, rural development and deepened unequal distribution of wealth. These condition-
ing factors are the economic, political and social structures that tend to reinforce each other
but are not deterministic, for example the types of institutions, the interaction between
the public and private sector, and the threats and opportunities that rise. Thorp analyzes
each country￿ s set of conditions and ￿nds common behaviors.
5.5.2 Description of Groups
Good Institutions
The group of good institution is composed of seven countries: Chile, Argentina, Uruguay,
Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica and Brazil. Although some of the countries in this group71
have had weakened institutions, such as Argentina, they have managed to reach either
acceptable growth rates, good welfare standards or both. Therefore Argentina is included
in this group, because even after their crisis in 2001, they still have the highest HDI level
of South America14.
On the one had, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico were able to use the paradigm
shift in a creative and e⁄ective way thanks to the prior conditions they met. Chile is the best
example. Although their degree of inequalities and poverty is still high, they have managed
to build strong institutions, and good relations among the public and private sector. The
State promoted exports and investments. Even though they have applied radical orthodox
policies and hosted radical violent military regimes, they have built a political consensus.
They truly committed to the rules of the free market game, gaining investors con￿dence.
Moreover Chile has developed a process of consultation to identify poorly designed policies.
In general Chile had historically stronger institutions than elsewhere in LA.
Argentina and Uruguay had a similar experience to Chile. Both went under military
regimes but Argentina did not learn from this experience as Chile did while Uruguay built
its political consensus from it. Argentina had a lot of political problems and adopted both
orthodox and heterodox policies (as Mexico). In the 90s it implemented the "convertibility
plan"15, whose purpose was to establish strict discipline on the monetary and ￿scal policy
and was the keystone for entry into the international system. This attracted investments
and together with the privatizations carried on, the quality of public services improved.
Between 1990-1994 Argentina grew at 5% (see table B.5). Nevertheless, in 2001 Argentina
went into a crisis. The weak ￿scal policy, big ￿scal de￿cits from the provincial governments
were re￿ ected in an increasing public debt burden, and the growing overvaluation led
to a debt crisis on adjustment of exchange rate, behaving as a delayed version of the
debt crisis explained in section 5.5.1. Moreover, both Uruguay and Argentina were part
of MERCOSUR, which helped them to promote dynamic ￿rms. Uruguay was the only
14IDH, PNUD 2006
15the "convertibility plan" established, in 1991, a currency board with a ￿xed exchage rate (to the US
dollar) dictated by law.This brought con￿dence on the national currency and reduced uncertainty72
country to have improved their welfare indicators during this period and was known by the
democratic process of using popular consultation to approve policies.
Mexico, according to Thorp, used the paradigm shift as well, particularly because
of their strong international orientation (the NAFTA-North American Free Trade Agree-
ment16)
On the other hand, Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica, progressed not because of the
paradigm shift, but because they had been coherent with their policies earlier. Colombia,
for example, managed to build very strong and quali￿ed institutions that managed the
economic issues very well, they did not borrow too much nor had hyperin￿ ations. In fact,
Thorp points out that Colombia is the only country where liberalization coincide with a
growing state, re￿ ected in the rapid growth of social spending. Nevertheless, corruption
and drugs were serious social problems. Costa Rica is characterized by their democratic
values, good relations with the private sector and high standard of education. The adoption
of the "Package" was costly as Thorp mentions, because they were already stable but after
the debts crises their social indicators even diminished slightly. Finally Brazil, due to its
size was allowed to integrate to the global market in its own way and speed as everybody
wanted to have access to Brazils huge market.
Painful
The Painful group, is composed of nine countries: Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. This groups is characterized
by having weak institutions that lead to bad results either in terms of growth, welfare or
both.
Bolivia and Peru did not meet the prior conditions that link growth with welfare.
Their structural problems exposed them dramatically to the perils of globalization and
they applied orthodox policies. Peru had institutional weakness, lack of experience and
lack of democracy to sustain the reforms. Bolivia, took a lot of time to recover from the
16Is a trade bloc between USA, Canada and Mexico73
battle with hyperin￿ ation, which was impossible without severe repression. Moreover their
levels of poverty are among the highest in the region.
Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, are
characterized by having had bad experiences with the "paradigm shift". They lacked insti-
tutions that could pursue opportunities or neutralize threats, didn￿ t take into account the
huge social costs of the paradigm shift, had social con￿ icts with guerrilla forces (Guatemala
and El Salvador), and problems of contraband (Paraguay). As an oil country, Venezuela
mismanaged several oil booms, provoking a banking crisis in 1991. Although they lib-
eralized there was a lack of political support and proper communication of the reforms,
resulting in resistance. Venezuela, Ecuador and Paraguay faced strong opposition in abol-
ishing all protection. And after 34 years of a military regime17, Paraguay could not build
an e¢ cient system of Government.
The central American economies were severely a⁄ected by the crises, (except Costa
Rica) because they had a lot of oppression and corrupt military and civilian regimes. They
tried to undertake market reforms but due to its political fragility they couldn￿ t succeed.
Moreover, poverty and exclusion are a common denominator for these countries.
Vulnerable
Finally, the vulnerable group include sixteen Caribbean countries: Bahamas The, Bar-
bados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica,
Panama, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Trinidad and Tobago.
The Caribbean countries were more severely a⁄ected by the adverse trends of the 1970s
and 1980s than the rest of LA. While one or two countries could bene￿t by developing
￿nancial services (the Bahamas, for example), most acquired debt and vulnerability to
capital ￿ ight and international interest rate changes. These economies are characterized
17Stroessner was president of Paraguay from 1954-198974
by being too vulnerable to external shocks. They are quite open18 and primary products
producers. Their agricultural sector performed so poorly that they are net food importers.
Although Cuba is di⁄erent from the other countries, it is still extremely vulnerable to
external factors. When the Soviet Union collapsed, their exports were reduced dramatically.
Additionally Caribbean countries are exposed to natural disasters. Equality and human
development in the Caribbean countries is characterized by the case of Haiti. Between
1991 and 1997 Haiti lost 31 places in the United Nation Human Development Index (HDI)
ranking; Cuba and Jamaica lost 24.
5.5.3 Convergence Results
Catching-up Countries
Period 3 The fast growing countries were Chile, (2.8%), Trinidad and Tobago (2.2%)
and Dominican Republic (2%) and the poorest countries at the beginning of the period, in
1975 were St.Vincent and the Grenadines (945$), Haiti (1,032 $) and Honduras (1,570 $).
Therefore none of the poorest countries catched up.
Good Institutions From the good institutions group, the poorest countries were Colom-
bia (3,622 $) and Brazil (4,190 $) and fastest growing countries besides Chile were Colombia
and Uruguay (1.5%). Therefore, the country catching up was Colombia.
Painful From the Painful, the poorest country besides Honduras was Paraguay (2,220 $)
and the fastest growing countries were Ecuador and Paraguay (1.1%). Therefore Paraguay
was catching up among the countries in the tail.
Vulnerable From this group, the country at the tail in 1975, besides St.Vincent and
the Grenadines and Haiti was Dominican Republic (2,111$) and the fastest growing was
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Figure 5￿6: Sigma convergence in period 3, good institutions,
painful and vulnerable groups. Standard deviation of the logarithm of
GDP per capita among countries in each group.
besides Trinidad and Tobago and Dominican Republic Panama (1.6%). Therefore the
country catching up is Dominican Republic
￿-convergence
Period 3 Across all countries, the GDP per capita dispersion along the third period seems
to be overall constant (Figure 5￿6). It is hard to determine whether there was ￿-convergence
or not. It seems that countries ￿-converged until 1990 and ￿-diverged afterwards until 2003
where they again showed a decrease in their dispersion. The reason of convergence until
1990 is due the adjustment of the debt crises.
Good Institutions The good institutions group experienced slight ￿-convergence until
1990 and then ￿ divergence. The reason is that almost all countries experienced negative76
growth rates after the debt crises, except Colombia. On average growth rates for the period
1980-1984 were -2%. For the next ￿ve year period, 1985-1989, almost all countries recov-
ered with positive growth rates, except Argentina (-3%). After 1990 the richest countries
recovered such that the dispersion levels increased again.
Painful The Painful group have the highest dispersion levels and during the whole period
it is fairly constant. After the debt crises all countries, except Paraguay went into recession
(negative growth rates). But some countries did worse than the others and took a lot more
time to recover. For instance Nicaragua experienced from 1975 to 1994, in average, a
negative growth rate of -12%. Almost all countries experienced negative growth rates from
1980-1989, except Ecuador and Paraguay (see Table B.14 in appendix).
Vulnerable The Vulnerable countries, the Caribbean, are characterized by being quite
homogenous, their GDP dispersion is very low. However it seems that there was ￿-
convergence until 1995, and from there the dispersion rate increased reaching the highest
dispersion in 1999 and then lowered again.
The lowest dispersion was of 1994 and was due to the fact that the richest countries
experienced negative growths. The Bahamas and Barbados had negative growth rates,
of around -3% during 1990-1994. Around 1999 their GDP dispersion was the highest,
because some countries did very well but others poorly, like Haiti, which around 2000 had
the periods lowest GDP per capita
Absolute and conditional ￿-convergence
From table 5.3, the ￿rst column shows the results of the absolute ￿-convergence estimated
by the NLS method. The good institution group converged at a speed of 3%, the painful
at nearly 1% and the Vulnerable diverged. The speeds of convergence estimated by panel
data are in Table 5.4. All groups together converged in an absolute and conditional way19.
19￿ is 14.5 for the Good Institutions group, 9.3 for the Painfull group, and 6.8 for the Vulnerable.77
The results of absolute ￿-convergence di⁄ered with the method for the case of the third
period and the vulnerable group. Since a lot of changes happened during the third period,
it is better to rely on the panel data estimations because they take into account time-
varying information. Therefore, the third period and the vulnerable group converged in
an absolute way at 0.7% and 0.05% respectively. The good institutions speed of absolute
￿-convergence was close to 2% and of conditional ￿-convergence was 3.6%. The Painful
speed for absolute ￿-convergence was 0.7% and for conditional 5.7%. The vulnerable speed
of conditional ￿-convergence was around 6%.
All groups in the third period and the third period itself have the same steady-state,
since absolute and ￿-convergence were found simultaneously. Therefore, the conjecture
made in the previous section 5.2.2 about the third period can be accepted and applied for
each of the groups. The conjecture was that common external factors were determinant of
the path of convergence, as is the debt crises, but also each country￿ s own experience in
reference to their behavior with respect to the usage of the paradigm shift.
5.6 Integration Processes
The integration processes that are more advanced in LA are four custom unions: the MCCA
(Mercado Comœn Centroamericano-Central American Common Market), CAN (Comu-
nidad Andina-Andean Community), CARICOM (Caribbean Community) and MERCO-
SUR. (Mercado Comœn del Sur - Southern Common Market).
Regarding convergence, ￿-convergence was found only for Caribbean union-CARICOM.
Absolute and conditional ￿-convergence was found for the Andean union-CAN and Caribbean
union -CARICOM. The southern cone union-MERCOSUR only presented conditional ￿-
convergence. These results suggest that neither the MERCOSUR nor CACM members
have the same steady-state while CARICOM and CAN are more homogenous and have
similar steady-states.78
5.6.1 Description of Groups
A custom union is a free trade area with a common external tari⁄. Members set up common
external trade policy, but in some cases they use di⁄erent import quotas. In LA there are
four custom unions
MCCA
The Central American countries union was created during the ISI, in 1960, and is composed
by ￿ve countries: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.
CAN
The Andean countries union was also created during the ISI, in1969, and nowadays has
four members: Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. Chile and Venezuela were members
as well, but Chile withdrew in 1976 and Venezuela in 2006.
CARICOM
The Caribbean countries union was created in 1975, and groups a lot of islands and english
speakers members: Antigua and Barbuda*, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat*, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname*, and Trinidad and Tobago.(the * countries are
excluded from the analysis due to lack of data).
MERCOSUR
Finally, the southern cone countries union was founded in 1986 and currently has ￿ve




Figure 5￿7 shows the ￿-convergence pattern for all custom unions for which data was
available. The line shows the year of creation. It seems that the Caribbean countries
have ￿-converged drastically after the CARICOM creation. Before the union￿ s creation
the Caribbean countries seemed to diverge a lot. Therefore, it may be concluded that the
creation of the union helped to diminish the dispersion among its members.
On the other hand, the Central American countries had constant levels of dispersions
but after the MCCA the dispersion shot upwards. Similarly, the Andean countries, after
their union CAN creation, seemed to have continued with their increasing dispersion.
The southern cone countries kept a constant level of dispersion after the MERCOSUR
creation. It looks as if the pattern of divergence was diminishing but after the union￿ s
creation, the pattern stopped and was kept constant.
Absolute and conditional ￿-convergence
The results of absolute and conditional ￿-convergence, during the year of each union￿ s
creation until 2005, are in tables 5.4 and 5.3. It can be seen that the Central American
countries members of the union MCCA have diverged under both absolute and conditional
concepts. So they do not share a steady-state.
The Andean countries union, CAN, show robust absolute ￿-convergence and conditional
￿-convergence. With NLS the absolute ￿-convergence was at a speed of 0.4% and with
panel data 0.1%. The conditional ￿-convergence was around 4%.
The Caribbean countries union, CARICOM, do not show robust results of absolute
￿-convergence because single cross section estimations show that the union members have
diverged and with panel data that they have converged. However, the panel data estima-
tions are preferred, which exhibit a low absolute ￿-convergence of 0.2% and a conditional
￿-convergence of 6%.
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Figure 5￿7: Sigma convergence in the Custom Unions of Central
American (MCCA), Andean (CAN), Caribbean (CARICOM) and
Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) countries. Standard deviation of the
logarithm of GDP per capita among countries in each group.81
divergence and conditional ￿-convergence. The conditional ￿-convergence was estimated
to be around 6%, suggesting that the union￿ s members are heterogenous and do not share
a common steady-state.
Linking the convergence ￿ndings to the theory presented in section 2.3, in order to reach
economic convergence the four LA custom unions need to be further deepened. Economic
convergence will be expected in the last stage of economic integration and the LA processes
of integration are just in the third stage.
Another implication of the results is that the custom unions are also showing grouping
by geography, and it seems that geography is not a determinant of groups where con-
vergence should be expected. Only the Andean and Caribbean seem to have a common
steady-state. The southern cone countries do not share a common steady-state and, sur-
prisingly, the Central American countries, which are closer to each other exhibit di⁄erent
steady-states.
5.7 Summary
This chapter has analyzed the history and evidence of convergence in LA. Before presenting
the results the chapter did a brief analysis of LA development and its convergence with
the world, particularly the US. It was found that LA growth has been volatile and discrete
and its development has worsened with time. Growth rates were higher at the beginning
of the 20th century than in recent years. Relative to the US and other countries, LA was
in a better position during the ￿rst 30 years. The few LA countries that were doing well
compared to the US at the beginning have lost ground during the last decades.
A great part of the chapter was devoted to understanding the di⁄erent historical eco-
nomic facts of each of the three periods and each of the groups of countries. In total 18
groups were analyzed statistically: a group of the 8LA across 106 years, a group of 8LA
in each of the three periods, a group for all LA countries, one for each of the three pe-
riods; two groups in period 1, the agricultural and mineral; two groups in period 2, the
industrializers and non-industrializers; three in period 3, good institutions, painful and vul-82
nerable; and four groups from the integration processes in LA, MCCA, CAN, CARICOM
and MERCOSUR. Convergence was expected to occur inside each group, since they had
similar processes of development (with or without intention).
The results of the convergence analysis are summarized in Table 5.5 where the ￿rst
column is for ￿-convergence, the second for absolute ￿-convergence and the third column
is for conditional ￿-convergence. 1 stands for convergence, - for divergence
￿-convergence among countries was found during the ￿rst period group, the 8LA (in
all periods and in each period), agricultural, mineral, industrializers, period 3 (until 1990),
good institutions (until 1990) and the CARICOM groups. Constant GDP per capita dis-
persion was found inside the Painful, at high levels of dispersion, and inside vulnerable and
MERCOSUR group, both at low levels of dispersion.
absolute ￿-convergence estimated by single cross section regression and panel data
showed similar results, demonstrating the robustness of the ￿nding, except for three cases
(in bold 1 in table 5.5). In those cases panel data estimations are preferred because of the
time varying information consideration.
The countries that exhibited absolute ￿-convergence were in the following groups: 8LA,
in 106 years and in each of the three periods, period 1, mineral, industrialized, period
3, good institutions, painful, vulnerable, the Andean countries union - CAN and the
Caribbean countries union-CARICOM. The average absolute speed of convergence was
around 2% with single cross section regression and 1% with panel data. The single cross
section regression is higher because it takes into account less information.
With panel data results, the groups at the top of high speeds of absolute ￿-convergence
were the minerals, with a speed of 3% and the 8LA-third period and Industrializers with
a speed of nearly 2% each. The lowest absolute speed of convergence was for the period 1,
CARICOM, CAN and vulnerable each with speeds of convergence below 0,5%.
conditional ￿-convergence was found in all groups except for the ￿rst period, the mineral
and the Central American countries union MCCA groups. The speed of convergence was in
average 5%. The highest speed of conditional ￿-convergence was for the non industrializers83
Sigma Absolute Conditional
All periods 8 LA 1 1 1
Period 1 1 1 -
1900-1930
8 LA 1 1 1
Agricultural (9) 1 - 1
Mineral (4) 1 1 -
Period 2 - - 1
1931-1974
8 LA 1 1 1
Industrialized (6) 1 1 1
Non-Industriliz (17) - - 1
Period 3 1ª 1ª 1
1975-2005
8 LA 1 1 1
Good Institutions (7) 1ª 1 1
Painful (9) 1 1
Vulnerable (16) 1ª 1
Regional Blocs
1960-2005 MCCA (5) - - -
1969-2005 CAN (4) - 1 1
1975-2005 CARICOM (12) 1 1ª 1
1986-2005 MERCOSUR (5) - 1
Groups of countries
Convergence
Table 5.5: Summary of convergence results. Where 1 stands for conver-
gence, - stands for divergence and blank stands for constant convergence. Substrict
a means that convergence is less robust. When a is in sigma means that conver-
gence was found only until 1990. When a is in absolute, means that convergence
was found only with panel data.84
group, 7%. The lowest speed of convergence was for the Industrializers, 1%.
For those groups of countries were absolute and ￿-convergence were found simultane-
ously, it can be said that their countries shared a common steady-state. The ones that
had the same steady-state, besides the 8LA, were the industrilizers in the second period
and all groups from the third period including the third period itself. From the inte-
gration processes the Andean countries union, CAN, and the Caribbean countries union,
CARICOM seem to have a similar steady-states as well.
These results are supported by facts along the LA history. During the second period
the industrializers converged because they were able to succeed, despite all the distortions
that the ISI brought, in innovating some industries making the technology transmission to
be more ￿ uent. All groups in the third period and the third period itself shared common
external factors that was determinant for the path of convergence, as the debt crises, and
also each country￿ s own experience in reference to their behavior with respect to the usage
of the paradigm shift.
On the other hand, in period 1 and in the mineral group absolute but not conditional
￿-convergence was found. The reasons were that they converged due to common external
factors as the WWI and due to the fact that Venezuela, a mineral country, discovered great
quantities of oil and was able to catch-up.85
Chapter 6
Conclusions
The economic convergence term is used when two or more economies tend to reach a similar
level of development and wealth. The study of economic convergence is an important topic
for economists; besides being useful for the debate between di⁄erent economic theories, it
has practical applications. It addresses inquiries as if the distribution of income between
economies has become more equal over the time, if poverty persists, if poor economies are
in their way of catching up the rich economies and at what speed, and if rich economies
tend to be always rich or the pattern of income-ranking can change.
After a revision of di⁄erent theories, several concepts of convergence were identi￿ed
such as ￿, ￿ absolute, ￿ conditional , club, and catching up convergence. The theoretical
framework chosen in the thesis is the neoclassical, from which a model is selected based
on the growth model of Solow (1956) and on the optimal growth model of Ramsey (1928).
The choice of the model is based on di⁄erent reasons; it has a solid theoretical base,
it is the most used in the literature, it is simple to test and it reaches concrete results
about convergence. The model is able to test whether income distribution among di⁄erent
economies has become more equal, ￿-convergence, and if there has been an upward mobility
in the same distribution and how fast this has been, ￿-convergence.
￿-convergence can be conditioned on speci￿c characteristics of the economies that do
not vary over time such as geography, weather, culture, etc. In that case, if ￿-convergence
is found, it is called conditional ￿-convergence. When these characteristic are excluded
and ￿-convergence is found it is called absolute ￿-convergence. When both absolute and
conditional ￿-convergence are found, economies tend to have similar steady-states.
￿-convergence and catching up convergence are measured in the same way but di⁄er in86
their arguments. The former is based on the argument of diminishing returns to capital and
the latter on the argument of technology transmission. A problem with the diminishing
returns to capital argument is that it predicts unrealistic high shares of capital. The
interpretation of the thesis results are based on the second argument, because it is a more
realistic case for LA.
Regarding club-convergence, although the usual procedures to study it, as Monte Carlo
simulations or Sthochastic Kernel distributions, were not done in the thesis, the results
can suggest resemblance with this concept because di⁄erent convergence groups, as clubs,
were identi￿ed.
This thesis has analyzed the case of convergence in LA. LA countries are characterized
by having few language barriers, similar culture, religion and common history. So con-
vergence could be expected. However, the literature for the LA case is scarce compared
to other countries especially the most developed and preliminary analysis showed that
divergence was present among all countries. The few studies about convergence in LA,
do not disentangle the di⁄erent periods in the economic history and its association with
convergence. Their results are quite diverse and not robust. The thesis has ￿lled the gap
by covering the theoretical, historical and statistical evidence of convergence in LA during
106 years, from 1900 to 2005.
The study has endeavored to analyze the most important historical facts of 32 LA
countries in more than a century. From this complicated task several groups were identi￿ed
in which convergence was expected to occur and later tested. In spite of the di¢ culties
with the data, absolute ￿-convergence was tested through single cross section regression
and panel data estimations controlling by time e⁄ects, conditional ￿-convergence was tested
through panel data estimations controlling by time e⁄ects and country speci￿c unobserved
characteristics, and ￿-convergence was analyzed by graphs of income dispersion. The
results in general show a success with the groupings. Below the results are presented in
the same order as the questions were stated in the introduction.
Has the convergence pattern changed in 106 years? Have economic shocks in87
LA in￿ uenced on the path of convergence? Is it possible to determine di⁄erent
periods of convergence? Under which periods have convergence accelerated?
What are the empirical and theoretical reasons?
The results showed that the general convergence pattern has changed in 106 years. The
changes were determined by several external shocks that whipped the LA region, especially
the Great Depression, the Oil crises of the 70s and Debt Crises of the 80s. These shocks
together with each countries responses determined three di⁄erent periods of convergence.
The ￿rst period ranges from 1900 until 1930 - year when the Great Depression whipped
LA economies- and it is characterized by LA intensively exporting primary products.
Therefore it is called Export-led as Development Tool. An inward-looking model was the
response to the Great Depression, so the second period is called Import Substitution In-
dustrialization which goes from 1931 to 1974 - when the oil crises occurred. Finally the
third period, Debt led growth, Structural Reforms and the Paradigm Shift ranges from 1975
to 2005, when LA experienced the debt crises of 1979 to 1980, responding with several
"structural reforms". From these reforms and from an accumulation of several factors dur-
ing history, the need for a change in development to one with a more social outlook in a
globalization context arose. This is called The Paradigm Shift.
Regarding convergence in each period, income distribution among LA countries changed
to be less disperse (￿-convergence) and an upward mobility in the income distribution
without conditionals (absolute ￿-convergence) was observed during the ￿rst and the third
periods. The speeds of absolute ￿-convergence in both cases were below 1%. Conditional
￿-convergence was found during the second and the third periods, at speeds of 6%. The
reason of higher speeds of convergence when conditioning by unobserved country-speci￿c
e⁄ects, is that conditional ￿ measures convergence under the hypothetical case that all
country di⁄erences are kept constant. Since absolute and conditional ￿-convergence were
found simultaneously during the third period, it can be concluded that LA countries from
1975-2005, tended to have a common steady-state.
A review of LA￿ s economic history suggests that the ￿rst period￿ s absolute ￿-convergence88
is due to common external factors that determined LAs development at that time such as
the high world demand for primary products and the ￿ uent capital in￿ ows. The increas-
ing trade of goods and capital allowed a more ￿ uent technology transmission across LA
countries.
The second period did not show absolute ￿-convergence among all countries, because
some countries industrialized and others did not. This placed barriers to the technology
transmission among all countries, but probably less barriers among those countries that
could industrialize.
During the third period, LA countries opened their economies and were concerned about
their institution building. These facts can explain the observed absolute ￿-convergence,
which means that technology transmission was acceptable ￿ uent.
Although absolute ￿-convergence was found for a great part of the sample, in total for
62 years, the speeds of convergence were very low compared to the usual 2%. A speed of
convergence of 1% implies that every 69 years an economy will be half way closer to reach
its steady-state.
Are there other groups besides the 8LA were convergence can be expected?
Have these groups in fact converged? Which groups have converged the most?
What are the empirical and theoretical reasons?
From the economic history revision it was found that some countries had similar char-
acteristics among them but di⁄erent characteristics with others. Therefore, in each period
two to three groups were identi￿ed by having similar characteristics and it was expected
that they would converge.
During the ￿rst period, since LA countries development was focused in primary prod-
uct exports, two groups were identi￿ed: the mineral and agricultural products exporters.
Throughout the second period, when countries followed a model of import substitution
industrialization-ISI, two groups were identi￿ed: those that were able to industrialize, de-
spite all the distortions that the model brought, and the non-industrializers which failed to
industrialize for di⁄erent reasons. During the third period, after the arise of a more social89
concern of development and a willingness to participate in the globalization process, three
groups were identi￿ed: good institutions countries, which developed institutions that could
deal with growth and/or welfare, painful processes countries, which were traumatized by
the debt crises adjustment, and vulnerable countries, which are the Caribbean countries
and are characterized by being vulnerable to external factors.
￿-convergence was found in the two groups of the ￿rst period: the agricultural and
mineral; in one group of the second period: the industrializers; and in one group of the
third period: the good institutions. Absolute ￿-convergence was found in the mineral
group at a speed of 3%, in the industrializers at 1%, in the good institutions group at 2%,
and in the painful group at a speed 1%.
Historically, the mineral group presented the most rapid speeds of absolute ￿-convergence
because the WWI favored them and Venezuela was able to catch up due to its oil. The
industrializers exhibited absolute ￿-convergence because they were able to succeed in in-
dustrializing, despite the distortions that ISI brought. The good institutions, built strong
institutions that could link growth with welfare and were able to insert themselves in the
global markets. And the painful, were equally dramatically whipped by the debt crises.
Theoretically, barriers to technology were less in these groups, but mostly in the mineral
and good institution group, where the speed of absolute ￿-convergence was higher.
After conditioning by speci￿c unobserved country characteristics, conditional ￿-convergence
was found for all groups except the mineral. Therefore the groups of countries that tended
to have similar steady-states were the industrializers, good institutions, painful and vul-
nerable groups.
What are the reasons behind the apparent convergence among the countries
in the 8LA? Should more convergence among them be expected? Why does it
seem that all the countries have diverged but not those from the 8LA? In the
future which countries may converge to which?
From the four groups that tended to have similar steady-states, the industrializers and
the good institutions groups presented stronger evidence that support that they have the90
same steady-state. The evidence is that their speeds of conditional ￿-convergence do not
vary greatly from their absolute ￿-convergence, as they do for the painful and vulnerable
groups.
The industrializers and good institutions groups are composed by almost the same
countries. The good institutions have one country that is not in the industrializers group:
Costa Rica. In total the countries in both groups number six: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay. Lets call these countries the new group.
Six countries out of the 8LA are from the new group, the remainder two that are
included in 8LA but not in the new group are Peru and Venezuela. Therefore, the observed
convergence at ￿rst among the 8LA is due to the strong presence of the new group-countries,
which showed convergence among each other. The average speed of convergence, absolute
and conditional, of the new group during 75 years was around 2% per year, as it is found
for the most developed countries. This implies that every 35 years a country from the new
group will be half way closer to reach its steady-state.
The results also showed that other countries that are not in the new group may con-
verge among them in the future. The painful and vulnerable groups have showed to have
similar steady-states. Therefore the painful countries, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras may converge in the future
at a slow speed of 1% and the vulnerable countries, which are the Caribbean countries,
may converge at a low rate of 0.05%.
Has economic integration processes in the region helped to accelerate the
process of convergence?
￿-convergence was found only among the Caribbean countries union-CARICOM, after
its creation. Absolute ￿-convergence was poorly present for the Andean countries after its
union creation, CAN, at a speed of 0.1% and for the Caribbean union-CARICOM, at a
speed of 0.2%. After controlling by country speci￿c e⁄ects, conditional ￿-convergence was
found for all unions except for the Central American countries union-MCCA. These results
suggest that neither the southern cone countries union-MERCOSUR nor the Central Amer-91
ican countries union-CACM members share the same steady-state while the Caribbean
union-CARICOM and the Andean countries union-CAN are more homogenous and have
similar steady-states.
Although, absolute ￿-convergence was found for two unions, their speed of convergence
was close to 0%. Therefore, the integration processes have not really helped to accelerate
the process of convergence among the union￿ s members. The reason is that they are in an
early stage of economic integration. Economic integration processes can bring economic
convergence when they are developed like the case of the European Union, where conver-
gence among European regions has accelerated especially after the creation of the monetary
union. In Latin America the integration processes need to be deepened.References
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Appendix A
Relation between ￿ and ￿- convergence
In order to see the relation between ￿ and ￿-convergence, it is necessary to refer to a similar
process used to get Equation(2.7), but now for country i, for discrete periods going from
t ￿ 1 to t and including a random disturbance uit. So the conditional ￿-convergence is:
log[yit=yi;t￿1] = ait ￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿)log[yi;t￿1] + uit (A.1)
where ait is:
ait = xi ￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿) ￿ [log(^ y￿
i ) + xi ￿ (t ￿ 1)]
By assumption uit is a random variable with mean 0 and a constant variance across
countries and time ￿2
u, independently distributed from ^ yi;t￿T, ujt for j 6= i and lagged
disturbances (this assumption is discussed below) .
To simplify it is assumed that ait = at, which is the absolute convergence concept.
Arranging terms :
log[yit] ￿ log(yi;t￿1) = at ￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿)log[yi;t￿1] + uit
log[yit] = at ￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿)log[yi;t￿1] + uit + log(yi;t￿1)
log[yit] = at + e￿￿ log[yi;t￿1] + uit
and calculating the variance across countries and de￿ning ￿2
t = V ar[log(yit)] and
￿2





Under the assumptions of e￿2￿ and ￿2
u being constant in time, it is possible to solve

































Figure A￿1: Evolution of ￿2





1 ￿ e￿2￿ (A.4)










When ￿ < 0 (￿-divergence), in Equation(A.4), it can be seen that ￿2
￿ will be negative
and therefore by Equation(A.3) ￿2
t will be increasing with time. So ￿-divergence cannot
lead to ￿-convergence. Therefore in order to have ￿-convergence it is necessary to have
￿-convergence.
But when ￿ > 0 (￿ -convergence) in Equation(A.3), ￿2
t monotonically approaches ￿2
￿
and whether ￿2
t goes up or down together with time depends on the relation of ￿2
0, with
respect to the steady-state value ￿2
￿: when ￿2
0 is higher than ￿2
￿ ￿2
t will diminish and
viceversa as it can be seen in the following ￿gure:
So when there is ￿-convergence, is not for sure ￿-convergence will exist (a falling ￿2
t).
So ￿-convergence is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for ￿-convergence.99
Appendix B
Description of Data
Country Abbreviation Country Abbreviation
Argentina arg Honduras hnd
The Bahamas bhs Haiti hti
Belize blz Jamaica jam
Bolivia bol St. Kitts and Nevis kna
Brasil bra St. Lucia lca
 Barbados brb Mexico mex
Chile chl Nicaragua nic
Colombia col Panama pan
Costa Rica cri Peru per
Cuba cub Puerto Rico pri
Dominica dma Paraguay pry
Dominican Republic dom El Salvador slv
Ecuador ecu Trinidad and Tobago tto
Grenada grd Uruguay ury
Guatemala gtm St. Vincent and the Grenadines vct
Guyana guy Venezuela ven
Table B.1: List of countries used in the thesis.100
g y g y g y g y
arg 1.59 3,529 1.44 5,254 0.31 7,873 1.15 5,531
bhs 1.64 12,500 1.64 12,500
blz 2.84 3,264 2.84 3,264
bol 1.24 1,871 0.36 2,423 0.78 2,151
bra 1.78 861 2.84 1,949 1.22 5,108 2.07 2,565
brb 1.73 9,306 1.73 9,306
chl 1.91 2,455 0.88 3,980 2.84 7,288 1.74 4,516
col 1.50 1,200 1.95 2,283 1.54 4,768 1.71 2,703
cri -0.29 1,647 2.29 2,423 1.24 5,121 1.63 3,305
cub 1,639 0.78 1,838 0.55 2,563 0.68 2,122
dma 2.76 1,932 2.76 1,932
dom 2.91 1,390 1.97 2,756 2.38 2,146
ecu 2.73 2,154 1.09 4,078 1.96 3,045
grd 2.11 3,542 2.11 3,542
gtm 3.35 1,459 1.45 2,269 0.20 3,301 1.20 2,547
guy 0.43 3,073 0.43 3,073
hnd 1.81 1,331 0.11 1,353 0.57 1,879 0.46 1,540
hti 0.07 1,006 -1.15 982 -0.56 994
jam 608 4.47 2,505 -0.04 3,479 2.02 2,961
kna 4.81 3,562 4.81 3,562
ica 2.83 2,074 2.83 2,074
mex 0.87 1,716 2.33 2,756 1.19 6,285 1.59 3,494
Nic 3.61 1,365 1.37 1,915 -2.58 1,829 0.17 1,820
pan 2.40 2,732 1.61 5,272 1.99 4,023
per 2.36 1,087 2.12 2,578 0.05 3,701 1.57 2,485
pri 5.07 4,270 2.85 10,243 3.90 7,371
pry 0.35 1,708 1.09 3,080 0.70 2,343
slv 1.22 981 1.89 1,563 0.45 2,424 1.29 1,806
tto 3.76 6,326 2.18 11,451 2.87 9,163
ury 1.90 2,942 0.64 4,422 1.49 6,758 1.24 4,686
vct 3.61 1,877 3.61 1,877







y Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Total
1900-1930 1931-1974 1975-2005 1900-2005
Table B.2: Growth rates and GDP per capita per period. Where g
is the average growth rate of GDP per capita per period, measured in %, and y is
the average GDP per capita per period, measured in International $.101
g y g y g y g y g y g y g y
mean 2.72 1772 2.16 2030 -0.94 2207 1.90 1982 1.60 1,716 2.49 1,899 1.65 1,934
sd 0.05 112 0.05 109 0.08 157 0.07 145 0.06 103 0.07 141 0.06 128
max 14.14 3191 8.63 3699 17.09 3904 15.19 3307 11.24 4,055 23.61 4,367 23.61 4,367
min -5.86 678 -12.29 718 -22.09 769 -10.25 798 -15.91 919 -15.53 925 -22.09 678
obs 16 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 40 45 45 46 161 171
arg mean 3.67 2907 2.95 3562 -2.27 3714 0.03 3136 4.08 3,707 1.48 4,145 1.66 3,529
sd 0.07 192 0.04 109 0.07 237 0.10 209 0.03 261 0.03 190 0.06 200
max 9.67 3191 8.63 3699 4.12 3904 15.19 3307 6.96 4,055 3.97 4,367 15.19 4,367
min -5.86 2717 -1.69 3459 -13.97 3302 -10.25 2790 -0.06 3,471 -3.41 3,919 -13.97 2,717
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
bra mean 1.23 710 1.71 751 0.10 801 2.76 829 2.69 1,001 2.10 1,074 1.76 861
sd 0.04 19 0.04 24 0.05 27 0.05 41 0.04 37 0.05 71 0.05 36
max 7.32 730 7.01 776 8.35 836 10.30 895 7.31 1,046 8.88 1,158 10.30 1,158
min -2.10 678 -2.83 718 -3.90 769 -4.15 798 -2.09 963 -1.81 1,007 -4.15 678
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
col mean 1.64 1,017 1.70 1,097 0.56 1,200 1.49 1,230 0.03 1,255 3.63 1,403 1.51 1,200
sd 0.02 26 0.02 28 0.04 37 0.05 62 0.00 0 0.03 105 0.03 43
max 4.90 1,039 4.65 1,131 3.30 1,236 7.92 1,292 0.16 1,255 6.59 1,505 7.92 1,505
min -0.21 973 -0.45 1,053 -6.07 1,162 -3.14 1,129 0.00 1,255 -0.02 1,255 -6.07 973
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
cri mean 1.28 1,621 -1.55 1,674 -0.14 1,647
sd 0.10 81 0.07 82 0.09 81
max 11.24 1,709 7.90 1,802 11.24 1,802
min -10.17 1,527 -9.66 1,582 -10.17 1,527
obs 4 5 5 5 9 10





gtm mean 4.18 1,371 2.69 1,547 3.44 1,459
sd 0.07 94 0.05 107 0.06 100
max 8.47 1,504 9.96 1,720 9.96 1,720
min -6.81 1,272 -2.95 1,460 -6.81 1,272
obs 4 5 5 5 9 10
hnd mean -2.74 1,246 5.45 1,416 1.36 1,331
sd 0.06 63 0.08 107 0.07 85
max 4.40 1,309 15.24 1,547 15.24 1,547
min -9.28 1,141 -3.17 1,295 -9.28 1,141
obs 4 5 5 5 9 10
nic mean 1.11 1,269 5.62 1,461 3.36 1,365
sd 0.08 55 0.14 216 0.11 136
max 6.79 1,321 23.61 1,750 23.61 1,750
min -10.38 1,183 -15.53 1,249 -15.53 1,183
obs 4 5 5 5 9 10
slv mean 2.18 959 0.46 1,003 1.32 981
sd 0.03 39 0.13 72 0.08 55
max 4.33 1,017 14.44 1,069 14.44 1,069
min -1.42 919 -14.38 925 -14.38 919
obs 4 5 5 5 9 10
ury mean 4.35 2,456 2.27 2,711 -2.16 3,113 3.33 2,732 1.61 3,014 2.49 3,627 1.98 2,942
sd 0.07 211 0.09 276 0.15 328 0.07 269 0.10 300 0.07 317 0.09 284
max 14.14 2,640 8.48 2,973 17.09 3,508 10.32 3,135 11.23 3,397 11.11 3,906 17.09 3,906
min 0.66 2,219 -12.29 2,334 -22.09 2,654 -7.18 2,470 -15.91 2,674 -6.36 3,188 -22.09 2,219
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30














Table B.3: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the agricultural
group. Where g is the growth rate of GDP per capita in %, y is the GDP per
capita in international $, mean is the average, sd the standard deviation, max and
min are the maximum and minimum values, and obs is the number of observations.102
g y g y g y g y g y g y g y
mean 1.89 1293 1.39 1411 0.27 1553 1.46 1620 4.02 1,703 5.38 2,247 2.40 1,638
sd 0.04 51 0.03 39 0.06 66 0.09 128 0.11 186 0.08 273 0.07 124
max 9.54 2120 8.80 2313 13.76 2656 25.37 2794 24.20 2,880 24.44 3,426 25.37 3,426
min -8.41 797 -7.43 793 -14.33 886 -24.82 921 -36.29 926 -12.99 1,157 -36.29 793
obs 16 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 116 120
chl mean 2.09 2,033 1.75 2,249 1.07 2,528 -2.48 2,514 5.79 2,446 3.30 2,959 1.92 2,455
sd 0.00 67 0.01 63 0.07 117 0.15 298 0.14 339 0.10 309 0.08 199
max 2.19 2,120 2.11 2,313 9.32 2,656 15.75 2,794 20.57 2,880 18.03 3,396 20.57 3,396
min 2.00 1,949 0.46 2,164 -8.35 2,420 -24.82 2,155 -16.32 2,064 -5.53 2,618 -24.82 1,949
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
mex mean 2.21 1,431 2.37 1,644 0.01 1,719 0.74 1,783 0.17 1,844 -0.76 1,878 0.79 1,716
sd 0.08 69 0.04 34 0.00 20 0.00 21 0.02 25 0.05 85 0.03 42
max 9.54 1,492 8.80 1,680 0.80 1,744 0.74 1,810 1.81 1,884 4.45 1,991 9.54 1,991
min -8.41 1,348 -2.20 1,594 0.67 1,694 0.73 1,757 -3.19 1,823 -6.02 1,757 -8.41 1,348
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
per mean 1.64 853 1.69 920 0.00 997 7.04 1,180 0.00 1,185 4.12 1,389 2.41 1,087
sd 0.02 21 0.02 23 0.06 47 0.13 131 0.23 191 0.10 181 0.09 99
max 4.95 872 4.52 949 3.32 1,037 25.37 1,318 24.20 1,331 10.33 1,619 25.37 1,619
min -0.34 817 -0.44 884 -11.24 927 -4.69 974 -36.29 926 -12.99 1,157 -36.29 817
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
ven mean 1.62 853 -0.26 832 0.02 969 0.54 1,002 10.12 1,336 14.86 2,763 4.48 1,292
sd 0.06 46 0.05 34 0.10 81 0.09 61 0.07 190 0.06 517 0.07 155
max 7.17 913 5.91 865 13.76 1,104 14.94 1,069 17.67 1,630 24.44 3,426 24.44 3,426
min -4.16 797 -7.43 793 -14.33 886 -7.33 921 2.18 1,173 10.19 2,081 -14.33 793








Countries 1900-1930 1900-1904 1905-1909 1910-1914 1915-1919 1920-1924 1925-1929
Table B.4: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the mineral
group. Where g is the growth rate of GDP per capita in %, y is the GDP per
capita in international $, mean is the average, sd the standard deviation, max and
min are the maximum and minimum values, and obs is the number of observations.103
g y g y g y g y g y
mean -1.76 2,322 2.55 2,581 1.29 2,721 2.51 3,093 2.03 3,401
sd 0.10 231 0.03 94 0.04 111 0.04 173 0.02 132
max 15.79 4,301 9.44 4,148 10.69 4,579 9.22 5,252 6.59 5,391
min -29.80 1,004 -3.20 1,150 -9.83 1,229 -8.71 1,390 -7.27 1,672
obs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
arg mean -2.55 3,756 1.52 4,041 1.98 4,302 1.95 4,882 -0.27 4,926
sd 0.07 217 0.03 105 0.04 167 0.06 364 0.04 136
max 5.99 4,080 5.31 4,148 9.06 4,579 8.71 5,252 3.28 5,073
min -9.45 3,522 -1.30 3,912 -2.41 4,161 -4.99 4,356 -7.27 4,717
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
bra mean 0.09 1,058 2.01 1,235 1.86 1,308 3.60 1,533 2.15 1,752
sd 0.06 55 0.03 50 0.06 69 0.03 102 0.01 69
max 6.01 1,142 7.14 1,276 10.69 1,386 7.68 1,659 3.49 1,848
min -8.17 1,004 -1.04 1,150 -6.12 1,229 0.29 1,390 0.75 1,672
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
chl mean -2.64 2,676 1.32 3,121 1.28 3,315 1.84 3,681 1.98 3,998
sd 0.18 383 0.03 100 0.02 84 0.07 137 0.02 143
max 15.39 3,143 5.89 3,241 3.59 3,400 9.22 3,806 3.57 4,159
min -29.80 2,274 -3.20 2,987 -1.66 3,205 -8.71 3,470 -1.41 3,821
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
col mean 0.28 1,507 4.44 1,784 -0.45 1,852 2.47 2,023 2.25 2,230
sd 0.04 50 0.03 90 0.03 41 0.02 77 0.01 88
max 4.27 1,577 9.44 1,905 3.89 1,895 6.02 2,107 3.53 2,358
min -3.30 1,448 0.37 1,677 -2.46 1,792 0.41 1,899 -0.13 2,150
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
mex mean -2.20 1,542 3.32 1,775 3.01 2,009 1.30 2,224 2.45 2,478
sd 0.11 109 0.03 72 0.03 115 0.02 62 0.04 88
max 8.95 1,643 6.31 1,858 5.14 2,159 3.53 2,304 6.59 2,605
min -17.99 1,373 -0.09 1,660 -0.33 1,852 -1.20 2,134 -2.63 2,365
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
ury mean -3.56 3,394 2.73 3,529 0.07 3,543 3.91 4,214 3.60 5,020
sd 0.16 574 0.02 148 0.07 191 0.03 296 0.02 269
max 15.79 4,301 6.00 3,692 10.64 3,705 8.15 4,504 6.15 5,391
min -20.61 2,750 0.09 3,356 -9.83 3,331 1.58 3,764 0.03 4,659

















1950-1954 1930-1934 1935-1939 1940-1944 1945-1949
Table B.5: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the industrializ-
ers group. Where g is the growth rate of GDP per capita in %, y is the GDP per
capita in international $, mean is the average, sd the standard deviation, max and
min are the maximum and minimum values, and obs is the number of observations.104
g y g y g y g y g y
mean 1.13 3,689 2.02 3,908 2.41 4,304 2.93 4,948 1.68 3,441
sd 0.04 145 0.03 128 0.03 190 0.02 284 0.04 165
max 7.67 5,698 8.28 5,926 8.52 7,037 9.24 8,334 15.79 8,334
min -10.59 1,896 -3.99 2,335 -5.23 2,448 -7.56 3,057 -29.80 1,004
obs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 270 270
arg mean 1.02 5,384 2.46 5,696 3.44 6,541 3.38 7,753 1.44 5,254
sd 0.05 198 0.06 198 0.03 294 0.01 403 0.04 231
max 5.04 5,698 8.28 5,926 7.23 7,037 4.57 8,334 9.06 8,334
min -8.35 5,237 -3.99 5,455 -0.79 6,321 1.38 7,302 -9.45 3,522
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
bra mean 3.68 2,030 2.14 2,444 2.91 2,619 7.12 3,568 2.84 1,949
sd 0.03 135 0.03 66 0.03 164 0.02 421 0.03 126
max 5.71 2,221 5.00 2,511 5.72 2,860 9.24 4,083 10.69 4,083
min -1.53 1,896 -1.92 2,335 -0.97 2,448 5.05 3,057 -8.17 1,004
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
chl mean 0.26 4,135 2.43 4,528 2.36 5,049 -0.89 5,318 0.88 3,980
sd 0.04 147 0.02 166 0.04 251 0.05 261 0.05 186
max 7.67 4,282 3.88 4,694 8.52 5,281 6.75 5,663 15.39 5,663
min -3.01 3,954 -0.02 4,320 -1.33 4,631 -7.56 5,050 -29.80 2,274
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
col mean 0.95 2,404 1.57 2,581 2.14 2,815 3.91 3,352 1.95 2,283
sd 0.02 40 0.01 67 0.01 112 0.01 214 0.02 87
max 3.74 2,473 2.95 2,675 3.51 2,976 4.92 3,618 9.44 3,618
min -0.73 2,373 0.13 2,497 0.52 2,689 3.18 3,094 -3.30 1,448
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
mex mean 2.93 2,918 3.50 3,295 3.05 3,939 3.57 4,626 2.33 2,756
sd 0.02 122 0.03 182 0.00 194 0.02 298 0.03 138
max 5.13 3,025 7.24 3,594 3.76 4,185 5.25 5,003 8.95 5,003
min -0.29 2,742 0.53 3,155 2.73 3,702 0.99 4,320 -17.99 1,373
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
ury mean -2.07 5,261 -0.01 4,906 0.54 4,859 0.52 5,071 0.64 4,422
sd 0.05 226 0.02 89 0.04 125 0.03 105 0.05 225
max 1.29 5,402 2.05 5,036 5.01 4,991 3.80 5,184 15.79 5,402
min -10.59 4,860 -3.60 4,820 -5.23 4,721 -3.68 4,945 -20.61 2,750
















1965-1969 1970-1974 1955-1959 1960-1964 1930-1974 Countries
Table B.6: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the industrial-
izers group (continued).105
g y g y g y g y g y
mean -2.76 1,533 3.13 1,678 0.84 1,733 2.20 2,028 1.79 2,271
sd 0.13 176 0.09 168 0.10 167 0.07 177 0.04 119
max 28.27 3,444 29.75 4,305 28.02 4,309 19.24 7,544 12.65 8,417
min -23.89 823 -27.05 972 -42.26 970 -16.31 1,042 -14.94 1,027
obs 40 40 40 43 51 52 63 67 81 85
bol mean 0.78 1,714 0.63 1,912
sd 0.00 21 0.08 111
max 0.98 1,743 9.62 2,031
min 0.58 1,690 -12.06 1,799
obs 4 5 5 5
cri mean -1.92 1,544 5.24 1,734 -4.94 1,702 7.51 1,925 1.50 2,134
sd 0.12 109 0.04 161 0.10 175 0.05 226 0.08 184
max 15.56 1,660 11.87 1,876 9.72 1,943 14.60 2,123 10.71 2,353
min -14.45 1,421 -0.48 1,527 -14.08 1,459 1.36 1,614 -7.85 1,951
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
cub mean -6.30 1,192 3.30 1,498 2.89 1,440 3.66 1,918 -0.02 2,057
sd 0.16 206 0.17 179 0.20 180 0.10 131 0.09 133
max 14.20 1,505 13.73 1,779 28.02 1,631 11.33 2,121 6.13 2,207
min -23.89 977 -27.05 1,358 -19.08 1,208 -14.06 1,776 -14.94 1,900
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5





ecu mean 1,301 2.51 1,401 4.66 1,692 2.45 1,962
sd 0.05 77 0.06 187 0.04 111
max 1,301 9.41 1,494 10.09 1,880 9.05 2,103
min 1,301 -2.49 1,323 -2.11 1,443 -1.50 1,835
obs 1 5 5 5 5 5 5
gtm mean -2.59 1,529 9.71 2,181 -6.88 2,389 3.85 1,962 -0.79 2,051
sd 0.10 174 0.13 280 0.21 550 0.07 139 0.01 21
max 10.76 1,776 29.75 2,457 11.00 2,825 14.51 2,111 0.69 2,085
min -16.05 1,358 -4.40 1,712 -42.26 1,741 -1.37 1,732 -1.51 2,029
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
hnd mean -4.27 1,395 -1.65 1,110 -2.07 1,065 5.30 1,295 -0.17 1,347
sd 0.07 165 0.05 29 0.06 77 0.08 47 0.05 47
max 4.20 1,564 3.84 1,135 3.94 1,160 19.24 1,333 4.67 1,421
min -13.04 1,211 -6.50 1,063 -11.49 1,006 -1.54 1,219 -8.92 1,300





















Countries 1930-1934 1935-1939 1940-1944 1945-1949 1950-1954
Table B.7: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the non-
industrializers group. Where g is the growth rate of GDP per capita in
%, y is the GDP per capita in international $, mean is the average, sd the stan-
dard deviation, max and min are the maximum and minimum values, and obs is
the number of observations.106
g y g y g y g y g y
mean 1.94 2,627 2.18 2,894 2.16 3,310 2.83 3,778 1.59 2,428
sd 0.04 151 0.03 140 0.03 144 0.02 176 0.06 158
max 15.87 10,058 12.41 9,646 9.48 10,262 10.21 10,672 29.75 10,672
min -13.38 1,011 -8.85 931 -16.46 860 -5.52 906 -42.26 823
obs 85 85 83 85 85 85 85 85 613 627
bol mean -2.66 1,673 2.24 1,669 3.70 1,971 2.64 2,283 1.22 1,871
sd 0.04 112 0.02 70 0.02 130 0.01 102 0.03 91
max 2.99 1,853 3.92 1,762 5.78 2,120 4.18 2,418 9.62 2,418
min -8.29 1,575 -0.20 1,603 1.95 1,806 1.28 2,176 -12.06 1,575
obs 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 27 30
cri mean 2.53 2,474 2.62 2,821 4.03 3,371 4.03 4,102 2.29 2,423
sd 0.06 130 0.02 113 0.01 195 0.01 283 0.05 175
max 7.95 2,605 4.70 2,961 5.42 3,622 5.72 4,430 15.56 4,430
min -6.67 2,301 0.26 2,715 2.73 3,127 2.55 3,754 -14.45 1,421
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
cub mean 1.09 2,197 -0.56 2,038 0.11 2,078 2.80 2,124 0.78 1,838
sd 0.09 179 0.00 18 0.06 101 0.05 163 0.10 143
max 11.52 2,406 -0.09 2,052 9.14 2,248 6.89 2,324 28.02 2,406
min -13.38 2,005 -1.10 2,009 -7.75 1,988 -5.26 1,917 -27.05 977
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
dom mean 2.20 1,268 2.90 1,370 -0.43 1,366 7.05 1,830 2.91 1,390
sd 0.03 53 0.06 102 0.10 71 0.02 213 0.06 99
max 6.31 1,320 12.41 1,484 9.48 1,453 8.96 2,067 12.41 2,067
min -2.78 1,183 -5.60 1,232 -16.46 1,259 3.02 1,561 -16.46 1,027
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 24 25
ecu mean 1.00 2,150 1.73 2,326 2.55 2,629 4.22 3,090 2.73 2,069
sd 0.01 42 0.02 52 0.02 77 0.03 235 0.03 112
max 2.41 2,211 3.83 2,411 6.22 2,739 8.83 3,383 10.09 3,383
min -0.10 2,101 -0.44 2,279 -0.40 2,556 2.65 2,845 -2.49 1,301
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 36
gtm mean 2.27 2,172 1.89 2,363 2.49 2,675 3.09 3,096 1.45 2,269
sd 0.02 98 0.03 106 0.02 125 0.01 163 0.07 184
max 5.79 2,273 6.27 2,498 5.56 2,830 3.99 3,303 29.75 3,303
min -0.48 2,019 -0.51 2,262 1.19 2,534 2.37 2,905 -42.26 1,358
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
hnd mean 0.91 1,350 1.31 1,417 1.93 1,585 -0.32 1,610 0.11 1,353
sd 0.02 33 0.01 26 0.03 43 0.02 25 0.04 55
max 4.62 1,372 2.73 1,452 4.99 1,639 1.44 1,642 19.24 1,642
min -0.74 1,293 -0.78 1,387 -2.47 1,526 -4.21 1,574 -13.04 1,006






















1955-1959 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1930-1974
Table B.8: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the non-
industrializers group (continued)107
g y g y g y g y g y
hti mean 0.02 1,045 1.05 1,066
sd 0.00 2 0.04 28
max 0.56 1,048 6.08 1,102
min -0.27 1,042 -4.96 1,037
obs 4 5 5 5
jam mean 972 16.95 1,060 -8.67 1,581 8.42 1,558
sd 127 97 215
max 972 16.95 1,150 -8.67 1,649 11.72 1,858
min 972 16.95 970 -8.67 1,512 6.24 1,327
obs 1 1 2 1 2 4 5
nic mean -5.90 1,330 -0.25 1,140 2.36 1,439 0.41 1,480 6.08 1,816
sd 0.16 110 0.16 137 0.07 54 0.05 48 0.05 164
max 21.52 1,456 17.89 1,288 7.78 1,495 6.32 1,550 12.65 2,002
min -21.27 1,174 -25.55 997 -6.11 1,372 -4.78 1,423 -0.65 1,616
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
pan mean -0.98 2,105 -0.38 1,926
sd 77 0.04 56
max 2.09 2,200 3.54 1,993
min -8.33 2,024 -5.83 1,851
obs 4 5 5 5
per mean 1.58 1,414 1.44 1,813 -0.52 1,811 3.61 2,082 3.61 2,459
sd 0.19 241 0.04 51 0.10 129 0.03 73 0.01 142
max 28.27 1,753 6.97 1,884 11.07 1,998 8.85 2,199 5.28 2,634
min -14.30 1,148 -4.19 1,757 -12.86 1,643 0.97 2,005 2.63 2,263
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5





pry mean 1,894 -1.10 1,776 -0.59 1,662 -3.03 1,533
sd . 0.04 28 0.11 126 0.04 42
max 1,894 3.35 1,800 13.24 1,815 0.18 1,584
min 1,894 -7.77 1,741 -16.31 1,524 -9.38 1,495
obs 1 5 5 5 5 5 5
slv mean -0.02 931 0.02 1,017 0.02 1,143 0.06 1,356 0.01 1,545
sd 0.10 79 0.08 36 0.07 60 0.16 269 0.03 60
max 0.11 1,045 0.08 1,065 0.07 1,235 0.23 1,707 0.05 1,616
min -0.12 823 -0.09 977 -0.07 1,074 -0.11 1,091 -0.02 1,480
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5





ven mean -2.69 2,927 7.26 3,795 0.02 3,836 11.20 6,576 2.19 7,898
sd 0.12 320 0.03 472 0.13 381 0.06 1034 0.03 363
max 8.02 3,444 12.18 4,305 18.68 4,309 16.90 7,544 5.63 8,417
min -22.37 2,613 3.81 3,181 -15.37 3,347 2.00 5,102 -1.09 7,462
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
1945-1949 1950-1954 Countries 1930-1934 1935-1939 1940-1944
Table B.9: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the non-
industrializers group (continued)108
g y g y g y g y g y
hti mean -1.73 1,053 -1.64 1,003 -1.04 888 3.74 984 0.07 1,006
sd 0.07 41 0.07 56 0.03 23 0.01 60 0.04 35
max 6.49 1,108 7.07 1,064 1.74 922 5.25 1,066 7.07 1,108
min -8.05 1,011 -8.85 931 -4.19 860 2.46 906 -8.85 860
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
jam mean 6.26 2,336 2.67 2,748 3.62 3,228 2.32 3,910 4.51 2,174
sd 221 95 161 129 149
max 11.96 2,541 5.19 2,904 5.81 3,480 10.06 4,130 16.95 4,130
min -0.41 2,020 0.74 2,654 1.56 3,070 -5.52 3,803 -8.67 970
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 26 30
nic mean 0.17 2,052 4.89 2,245 2.19 2,793 2.36 2,937 1.37 1,915
sd 0.04 41 0.04 240 0.03 62 0.05 171 0.07 114
max 5.00 2,111 7.88 2,578 5.90 2,875 10.21 3,236 21.52 3,236
min -3.13 2,008 -1.79 1,983 -1.82 2,734 -2.24 2,812 -25.55 997
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
pan mean 3.06 2,199 4.59 2,695 4.73 3,385 2.69 4,084 2.28 2,732
sd 0.03 113 0.02 220 0.01 244 0.02 179 0.02 148
max 7.40 2,322 7.36 2,920 5.50 3,699 5.06 4,250 7.40 4,250
min -1.28 2,055 1.32 2,391 4.14 3,085 -0.44 3,814 -8.33 1,851
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
per mean 1.00 2,754 4.47 3,261 1.32 3,675 2.55 3,935 2.12 2,578
sd 0.03 54 0.03 173 0.03 87 0.02 157 0.05 123
max 3.78 2,836 8.78 3,462 5.28 3,757 6.09 4,200 28.27 4,200
min -3.21 2,689 0.74 3,023 -2.46 3,532 0.03 3,807 -14.30 1,148
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
pri mean 4.70 2,940 6.13 3,916 5.66 5,256 4.32 6,894 5.05 4,270
sd 0.03 217 0.01 394 0.01 431 0.03 404 0.02 324
max 7.61 3,239 7.93 4,401 6.98 5,840 8.35 7,302 8.35 7,302
min 1.13 2,649 4.65 3,421 3.71 4,719 -0.75 6,349 -0.75 2,144
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 24 25
pry mean 1.11 1,571 1.30 1,629 1.40 1,764 3.39 1,980 0.35 1,726
sd 0.02 39 0.02 55 0.02 39 0.01 111 0.04 63
max 2.95 1,625 4.24 1,687 3.53 1,810 5.07 2,144 13.24 2,144
min -2.78 1,523 -1.63 1,555 -1.54 1,712 1.59 1,872 -16.31 1,495
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 35 36
slv mean 0.02 1,708 0.03 1,890 0.01 2,181 0.02 2,297 0.02 1,563
sd 0.02 50 0.04 125 0.02 48 0.02 99 0.06 92
max 0.05 1,748 0.08 2,058 0.03 2,216 0.04 2,436 0.23 2,436
min -0.01 1,624 0.00 1,764 0.00 2,101 -0.01 2,187 -0.12 823
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
tto mean 7.67 5,214 3.38 6,531 2.99 7,434 2.73 8,576 3.67 6,326
sd 0.05 566 0.03 230 0.01 350 0.02 334 0.03 319
max 15.87 5,743 8.48 6,801 4.75 7,897 4.30 9,053 15.87 9,053
min 2.36 4,316 1.22 6,251 1.27 7,030 0.33 8,244 -1.02 3,674
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 24 25
ven mean 3.44 9,549 -0.89 9,280 1.41 9,990 0.47 10,499 2.49 7,150
sd 0.04 581 0.04 301 0.02 258 0.03 168 0.06 431
max 9.75 10,058 4.58 9,646 3.25 10,262 3.91 10,672 18.68 10,672
min -2.43 8,750 -6.91 9,002 -1.68 9,677 -2.14 10,245 -22.37 2,613
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 45 45
Countries 1955-1959 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1930-1974
Table B.10: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the non-
industrializers group (continued)109
g y g y g y g y g y g y g y
mean 0.02 5315 -0.01 5551 0.01 5573 0.03 6124 0.02 6,948 0.01 7,181 0.01 6,115
sd 0.04 1069 0.04 1108 0.03 1085 0.03 1298 0.04 1417 0.03 1285 0.03 1210
max 0.08 8304 0.06 8206 0.08 7299 0.09 8367 0.14 9,585 0.07 11,462 0.14 11,462
min -0.16 3622 -0.17 4185 -0.08 4282 -0.06 4736 -0.08 5,131 -0.13 5,246 -0.17 3,622
obs 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 210 210
arg mean 0.00 8085 -0.02 7572 -0.03 6987 0.05 7421 0.01 8668 0.00 8245 0.00 7830
sd 0.05 201 0.04 377 0.06 315 0.04 747 0.05 482 0.07 454 0.05 429
max 0.05 8304 0.02 8206 0.06 7299 0.08 8367 0.07 9215 0.07 8695 0.08 9215
min -0.06 7807 -0.08 7243 -0.08 6523 -0.01 6436 -0.04 8005 -0.08 7594 -0.08 6436
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
bra mean 0.04 4560 -0.01 4792 0.02 5156 0.00 4944 0.01 5399 0.01 5628 0.01 5080
sd 0.02 260 0.06 262 0.03 140 0.04 133 0.01 72 0.02 72 0.03 157
max 0.07 4892 0.06 5198 0.06 5273 0.04 5163 0.03 5476 0.03 5747 0.07 5747
min 0.02 4190 -0.07 4500 -0.02 4917 -0.06 4802 -0.01 5296 -0.01 5571 -0.07 4190
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
chl mean 0.01 4790 -0.01 5347 0.04 5682 0.05 7255 0.03 9243 0.04 10432 0.03 7125
sd 0.10 456 0.10 470 0.03 474 0.03 670 0.03 400 0.02 656 0.05 521
max 0.08 5407 0.06 5956 0.08 6377 0.09 8010 0.07 9585 0.07 11462 0.09 11462
min -0.16 4323 -0.17 4898 0.01 5168 0.00 6402 -0.01 8612 0.02 9820 -0.17 4323
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
col mean 0.03 3873 0.00 4233 0.02 4548 0.02 4968 0.00 5399 0.02 5376 0.01 4733
sd 0.02 235 0.01 34 0.01 185 0.02 173 0.04 157 0.01 167 0.02 158
max 0.06 4184 0.02 4265 0.04 4739 0.04 5240 0.03 5542 0.03 5636 0.06 5636
min 0.00 3622 -0.01 4185 0.01 4282 0.00 4821 -0.06 5131 0.00 5246 -0.06 3622
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
cri mean 0.02 4700 -0.02 4498 0.01 4515 0.02 4961 0.05 5591 -0.01 6182 0.01 5074
sd 0.02 240 0.05 296 0.02 133 0.02 224 0.06 587 0.04 182 0.04 277
max 0.06 4959 0.05 4911 0.03 4698 0.05 5237 0.14 6571 0.06 6335 0.14 6571
min -0.01 4396 -0.10 4230 -0.02 4340 0.00 4736 -0.02 5138 -0.05 5957 -0.10 4230
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
mex mean 0.03 5433 0.01 6343 -0.01 5937 0.02 6330 0.01 6442 0.01 7037 0.01 6254
sd 0.02 327 0.05 243 0.03 164 0.01 154 0.05 327 0.03 93 0.03 218
max 0.06 5941 0.06 6683 0.02 6218 0.03 6536 0.04 6816 0.05 7157 0.06 7157
min 0.01 5146 -0.06 6082 -0.06 5810 0.00 6119 -0.08 6027 -0.02 6950 -0.08 5146
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
ury mean 0.04 5761 -0.02 6076 0.03 6187 0.03 6987 0.01 7895 -0.01 7367 0.01 6712
sd 0.02 315 0.06 532 0.04 393 0.02 447 0.04 370 0.09 535 0.05 432
max 0.06 6234 0.05 6668 0.08 6462 0.06 7567 0.04 8330 0.11 7861 0.11 8330
min 0.01 5421 -0.11 5520 -0.01 5567 0.00 6474 -0.04 7365 -0.13 6632 -0.13 5421


















Countries 1995-1999 2000-2004 1975-2004 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994
Table B.11: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the good insti-
tutions group. Where g is the growth rate of GDP per capita in %, y is the
GDP per capita in international $, mean is the average, sd the standard deviation,
max and min are the maximum and minimum values, and obs is the number of
observations.110
g y g y g y g y g y g y g y
mean 0.03 4182 0.01 4456 0.03 4601 0.01 4856 0.03 5,335 0.02 5,675 0.02 4,851
sd 0.05 362 0.05 220 0.04 312 0.04 240 0.03 306 0.03 298 0.05 290
max 0.16 12781 0.21 13471 0.14 13969 0.23 13824 0.11 14,423 0.13 16,627 0.23 16,627
min -0.21 945 -0.14 1133 -0.19 1063 -0.18 753 -0.03 777 -0.09 744 -0.21 744
obs 59 66 74 75 75 76 80 80 80 80 70 70 438 447
bhs mean 0.10 10079 0.01 12410 0.01 13843 -0.03 12962 0.02 12630 0.00 13457 0.02 12563
sd 0.06 1779 0.08 775 0.01 88 0.02 660 0.02 476 0.04 270 0.04 675
max 0.16 12781 0.11 13471 0.02 13969 0.00 13824 0.04 13219 0.04 13767 0.16 13969
min 0.03 8518 -0.10 11689 0.00 13739 -0.05 12162 -0.02 11973 -0.03 13272 -0.10 8518
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 27 28
blz mean 0.01 2164 0.01 2395 0.05 2534 0.05 3594 0.01 3750 0.05 4778 0.03 3203
sd 0.04 74 0.05 69 0.06 281 0.05 322 0.04 138 0.05 280 0.05 194
max 0.05 2263 0.09 2474 0.11 2960 0.10 3886 0.08 3996 0.10 5126 0.11 5126
min -0.04 2087 -0.04 2320 -0.01 2279 -0.02 3116 -0.03 3673 -0.03 4421 -0.04 2087
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
brb mean 0.04 7854 0.00 8720 0.04 9806 -0.02 9648 0.03 10503 0.02 9306
sd 0.04 575 0.06 400 0.05 764 0.05 311 0.02 613 0.04 533
max 0.08 8736 0.07 9364 0.11 10671 0.03 9973 0.05 11254 0.11 11254
min -0.01 7327 -0.06 8350 0.00 8651 -0.07 9268 0.01 9828 -0.07 7327
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 24 25
cub mean 0.03 2541 0.02 2869 0.00 3005 -0.09 2291 0.04 2121 0.04 2549 0.01 2563
sd 0.01 127 0.03 141 0.01 29 0.09 474 0.03 135 0.02 126 0.03 172
max 0.05 2695 0.07 3020 0.01 3045 0.01 2948 0.08 2297 0.05 2738 0.08 3045
min 0.01 2404 -0.02 2644 -0.02 2975 -0.18 1844 0.01 1925 0.02 2414 -0.18 1844
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
dma mean -0.05 1137 0.07 1315 0.06 1760 0.02 2100 0.03 2411 -0.02 2448 0.02 1862
sd 0.23 121 0.03 124 0.03 176 0.01 60 0.02 138 0.05 151 0.06 128
max 0.11 1261 0.12 1476 0.09 1949 0.04 2184 0.06 2601 0.04 2701 0.12 2701
min -0.21 1019 0.04 1145 0.02 1551 0.01 2023 0.01 2230 -0.09 2334 -0.21 1019
obs 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 27 28
dom mean 0.02 2219 0.01 2408 0.02 2417 0.00 2533 0.05 3026 0.02 3723 0.02 2721
sd 0.01 68 0.02 28 0.06 143 0.04 74 0.02 280 0.03 81 0.03 112
max 0.04 2289 0.04 2450 0.10 2649 0.04 2629 0.06 3401 0.06 3804 0.10 3804
min 0.00 2111 -0.02 2372 -0.05 2292 -0.07 2446 0.03 2703 -0.02 3610 -0.07 2111
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30











Table B.12: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the vulnerable
group. Where g is the growth rate of GDP per capita in %, y is the
GDP per capita in international $, mean is the average, sd the standard
deviation, max and min are the maximum and minimum values, and
obs is the number of observations.111
g y g y g y g y g y g y g y
grd mean 2948 0.00 3033 0.05 3419 0.01 4175 0.02 3394
sd 0.03 64 0.03 332 0.04 63 0.03 153
max 2948 0.05 3113 0.09 3914 0.08 4247 0.09 4247
min 2948 -0.02 2955 0.03 3088 -0.03 4097 -0.03 2948
obs 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 15 16
guy mean -0.01 2963 -0.02 2778 0.04 2812 0.00 2972 0.03 3370 0.00 3476 0.00 3062
sd 0.03 95 0.07 223 0.08 210 0.04 55 0.05 190 0.02 54 0.05 138
max 0.03 3088 0.06 3086 0.13 3052 0.04 3021 0.08 3570 0.03 3534 0.13 3570
min -0.04 2844 -0.12 2552 -0.07 2578 -0.05 2892 -0.03 3086 -0.02 3422 -0.12 2552
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 29 30
hti mean 0.03 1124 -0.01 1224 -0.02 1098 -0.07 905 0.02 805 -0.02 784 -0.01 990
sd 0.04 69 0.04 56 0.01 35 0.06 125 0.01 19 0.01 28 0.03 55
max 0.07 1221 0.07 1304 -0.01 1146 -0.02 1041 0.03 827 -0.01 818 0.07 1304
min -0.03 1032 -0.05 1168 -0.03 1063 -0.16 753 0.01 777 -0.04 744 -0.16 744
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
jam mean -0.03 3527 -0.01 3150 0.02 3160 0.02 3650 -0.01 3610 0.01 3700 0.00 3466
sd 0.03 195 0.03 27 0.05 206 0.02 55 0.02 88 0.01 81 0.03 108
max 0.00 3845 0.01 3188 0.07 3449 0.05 3722 0.01 3753 0.02 3770 0.07 3845
min -0.08 3336 -0.07 3121 -0.06 2953 -0.01 3588 -0.03 3539 -0.01 3578 -0.08 2953
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
kna mean 0.07 1645 0.03 1847 0.10 2779 0.04 3683 0.04 4889 0.02 5300 0.05 3357
sd 0.02 124 0.07 107 0.01 453 0.03 315 0.05 431 0.02 210 0.03 273
max 0.09 1775 0.14 2020 0.11 3396 0.07 4108 0.11 5308 0.06 5650 0.14 5650
min 0.06 1529 -0.04 1761 0.09 2238 -0.01 3357 -0.03 4227 0.00 5112 -0.04 1529
obs 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 27 28
lca mean 0.03 1261 0.05 1578 0.06 2420 0.01 2528 -0.01 2477 0.03 2053
sd 0.14 118 0.09 196 0.10 82 0.02 41 0.03 60 0.07 99
max 0.21 1427 0.13 1829 0.23 2499 0.03 2579 0.03 2559 0.23 2579
min -0.14 1133 -0.07 1326 -0.01 2312 -0.01 2480 -0.05 2416 -0.14 1133
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 24 25
pan mean 0.01 4282 0.03 5226 -0.03 4979 0.04 4987 0.03 5645 0.02 6172 0.02 5215
sd 0.04 179 0.06 111 0.09 519 0.02 354 0.03 352 0.05 317 0.05 305
max 0.08 4518 0.12 5372 0.03 5394 0.07 5329 0.06 6100 0.07 6673 0.12 6673
min -0.02 4102 -0.02 5091 -0.19 4361 0.01 4476 -0.01 5306 -0.03 5837 -0.19 4102
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 30
pri mean 0.02 7489 0.00 8061 0.04 9355 0.03 11165 0.04 13256 0.04 14965 0.03 10715
sd 0.04 505 0.04 222 0.02 733 0.01 571 0.03 935 0.07 948 0.07 948
max 0.05 8164 0.06 8283 0.07 10246 0.04 11913 0.08 14423 0.09 15636 0.04 8164
min -0.04 6946 -0.04 7797 0.01 8373 0.02 10539 0.01 12341 -0.01 14295 -0.06 60291
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 5 5
tto mean 0.05 10446 -0.01 11826 -0.04 9760 0.02 9621 0.04 11163 0.06 14619 0.02 11239
sd 0.04 1043 0.07 809 0.02 662 0.02 272 0.02 612 0.05 1680 0.07 1680
max 0.09 11649 0.06 12794 -0.01 10664 0.05 10032 0.06 12030 0.13 16627 -0.01 10032
min 0.01 9118 -0.10 10794 -0.06 9112 0.00 9271 0.00 10503 0.02 12965 -0.13 61763
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
vct mean 0.06 1079 0.04 1346 0.06 1784 0.02 2139 0.02 2237 0.02 2496 0.04 1847
sd 0.04 104 0.02 87 0.07 191 0.03 44 0.02 118 0.03 118 0.07 191
max 0.10 1204 0.06 1444 0.14 1981 0.06 2184 0.05 2404 0.05 2678 0.05 1204
min 0.02 945 0.02 1223 0.00 1537 -0.02 2089 0.00 2133 -0.01 2400 -0.01 10327
obs 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 1975-2004 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 Countries
Table B.13: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the vulnerable
group (continued).112
g y g y g y g y g y g y g y
mean 0.01 3880 -0.02 3619 -0.01 3357 0.01 3342 0.01 3,505 0.01 3,464 0.00 3,528
sd 0.04 210 0.04 214 0.04 142 0.03 117 0.03 100 0.03 130 0.03 152
max 0.08 11251 0.11 10139 0.08 9080 0.11 9373 0.06 9,153 0.15 8,467 0.15 11,251
min -0.34 1570 -0.16 1774 -0.15 1512 -0.07 1308 -0.09 1,348 -0.10 1,442 -0.34 1,308
obs 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 270 270
bol mean 0.02 2644 -0.03 2399 -0.01 2121 0.02 2267 0.01 2479 0.01 2573 0.00 2414
sd 0.03 77 0.03 159 0.03 42 0.01 54 0.02 65 0.01 56 0.03 159
max 0.05 2715 -0.01 2572 0.02 2181 0.03 2343 0.03 2552 0.03 2662 -0.01 2181
min -0.02 2516 -0.06 2234 -0.05 2074 -0.01 2197 -0.01 2400 0.00 2529 -0.16 13951
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
ecu mean 0.04 3795 0.00 4064 0.00 3932 0.01 4009 0.00 4186 0.02 4349 0.01 4056
sd 0.02 236 0.03 110 0.06 145 0.01 70 0.03 86 0.02 172 0.06 236
max 0.06 4060 0.02 4181 0.08 4048 0.02 4099 0.02 4301 0.05 4627 0.02 4048
min 0.02 3459 -0.05 3922 -0.09 3697 0.00 3903 -0.05 4093 0.01 4194 -0.16 23267
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
gtm mean 0.02 3494 -0.03 3383 -0.01 2973 0.01 3085 0.02 3334 0.00 3494 0.00 3294
sd 0.02 163 0.03 243 0.02 35 0.01 64 0.00 94 0.01 10 0.03 243
max 0.04 3661 0.01 3681 0.01 3011 0.02 3164 0.02 3458 0.01 3503 0.01 3011
min -0.01 3263 -0.07 3117 -0.03 2930 0.00 3009 0.01 3229 -0.01 3479 -0.11 19026
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
hnd mean 0.05 1798 -0.02 1850 0.01 1858 0.00 1921 -0.01 1921 0.02 1924 0.01 1879
sd 0.04 171 0.02 70 0.02 53 0.04 57 0.03 47 0.01 43 0.04 171
max 0.07 1977 0.01 1930 0.03 1919 0.04 2011 0.01 1950 0.03 1991 0.01 1919
min 0.00 1570 -0.04 1774 -0.02 1793 -0.05 1871 -0.05 1837 0.00 1887 -0.16 10731
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
nic mean -0.08 2968 -0.01 2143 -0.06 1741 -0.03 1364 0.01 1374 0.01 1458 -0.03 1841
sd 0.16 471 0.03 47 0.05 189 0.02 58 0.02 29 0.02 18 0.16 471
max 0.05 3350 0.02 2195 -0.03 1946 0.01 1454 0.05 1422 0.03 1481 -0.03 1422
min -0.34 2152 -0.04 2076 -0.14 1512 -0.05 1308 -0.01 1348 -0.02 1442 -0.61 9837
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
per mean 0.00 4133 -0.03 3971 -0.03 3695 0.01 3009 0.02 3564 0.02 3726 0.00 3683
sd 0.02 85 0.08 346 0.10 341 0.07 165 0.04 66 0.03 178 0.10 346
max 0.03 4226 0.02 4283 0.07 4103 0.11 3296 0.06 3664 0.05 3992 0.02 3296
min -0.02 4008 -0.16 3559 -0.15 3183 -0.07 2868 -0.02 3504 -0.02 3542 -0.45 20664
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
pry mean 0.06 2543 0.01 3257 0.01 3147 0.00 3270 -0.01 3267 -0.01 3013 0.01 3083
sd 0.02 299 0.08 166 0.03 94 0.01 19 0.02 69 0.02 68 0.08 299
max 0.08 2954 0.11 3498 0.03 3282 0.01 3287 0.02 3331 0.02 3084 0.01 2954
min 0.03 2220 -0.06 3097 -0.03 3042 -0.01 3237 -0.03 3163 -0.04 2948 -0.14 17707
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
slv mean 0.01 2594 -0.04 2158 0.00 2099 0.03 2268 0.02 2617 0.00 2734 0.00 2412
sd 0.03 82 0.05 118 0.01 8 0.02 144 0.02 71 0.01 24 0.05 144
max 0.04 2715 0.01 2354 0.01 2106 0.05 2459 0.04 2720 0.01 2761 0.01 2106
min -0.04 2504 -0.10 2076 -0.01 2089 0.01 2119 -0.01 2550 0.00 2708 -0.15 14046
obs 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
ven mean 0.01 10947 -0.05 9341 -0.01 8645 0.01 8882 -0.01 8803 0.00 7904 -0.01 9087
sd 0.03 303 0.03 663 0.06 367 0.05 420 0.06 377 0.10 605 0.10 663
max 0.04 11251 -0.01 10139 0.03 9080 0.08 9373 0.05 9153 0.15 8467 -0.01 8467
min -0.02 10472 -0.07 8623 -0.11 8094 -0.06 8313 -0.09 8182 -0.10 6957 -0.46 50640








1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 1975-2004 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 Countries
Table B.14: Growth rates and GDP per capita for the painful
group. Where g is the growth rate of GDP per capita in %, y is the GDP per
capita in international $, mean is the average, sd the standard deviation, max and
min are the maximum and minimum values, and obs is the number of observations.113
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1985 Argentina Argentina Argentina Chile Chile Chile
(or before) (1978 and (1978), (1978), (1974-78) (1979) (1981)
1985), Chile Chile
Bolivia, (1975 and (1975)
Chile 1985) Uruguay







Dom. Rep. Costa Rica Mexico
1987 Guatemala Jamaica Jamaica
Jamaica
1988 Mexico Guatemala Costa Rica Chile
Guyana Brazil (circa 1988)
Paraguay
Guyana






1990 Dom. Rep. Brazil Bolivia Argentina Colombia



















1991 Argentina Colombia Argentina Dom. Rep. Belize Argentina
Colombia Nicaragua Honduras Jamaica Peru
Guatemala Uruguay Guatemala Guyana
Nicaragua Venezuela
Uruguay
1992 Ecuador Barbados Nicaragua Argentina Barbados
Guyana Peru Jamaica Mexico
Honduras
Jamaica
1993 El Salvador Ecuador Nicaragua Peru
Bahamas
1994 Brazil Belize Ecuador Barbados Chile Argentina
Haiti Guatemala Belize Peru Colombia








Table C.2: Structural Reform Policies in Latin America (contin-
ued).